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The Derivative Right,




The derivative right is at the very core of copyright theory. What
can and cannot be reused to create a new work impacts freedom of
expression but also impacts the value of the markets for works and
their various "derivatives." The derivative right includes forms of
derivation and adaptation, such as making a movie from a novel or
translating a book. It also covers what this Article refers to as
penumbral derivatives, which the US Copyright Act captures using the
phrase "based upon" with respect to preexisting works. This leads to
indeterminacy about the scope of the derivative right, which may have
chilling effects on nonprofessional Internet users who may not have the
time, desire, or resources to consider or negotiate copyright rights. This
Article acknowledges that derivation often includes reproduction of all
or part of a preexisting work. How is the derivative right different from
the right of reproduction? That is the main question tackled in this
Article. Using the Berne Convention negotiating history, as well as US,
British, French, and German jurisprudence, this Article suggests that
the derivative right has a different normative target than the right of
reproduction, in spite of their considerable overlap. The Article
enunciates six mobilizing principles, which it then proceeds to
Ph.D. Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. Director, Vanderbilt
Intellectual Property Program. The Author is extremely grateful to Professors Abraham
Drassinower, Jane C. Ginsburg, Paul Goldstein, Tyler Ochoa, Pamela Samuelson, and William
Patry for their comments on earlier versions of this Article. All errors and omissions are the
Author's. I also wish to thank Adriane Porcin (Visiting Scholar, Vanderbilt University Law
School), and Kathryn Baker, Lauren Gregory, and Colleen Mallea (three J.D. candidates,
Vanderbilt University Law School) for their useful assistance in preparing this Article, and the
excellent work done by the VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF ENTERTAINMENT & TECHNOLOGY LAW, in
particular the Editor-in-Chief, Shane D. Valenzi, and the Executive Editor, Michael F.
Dearington. The title refers to Hoffman L's quip that "Copyright law protects foxes better than
hedgehogs" in Designer Guild Ltd. v. Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd., [2000] UKHL 58, [2001] 1
W.L.R. 2416 (appeal taken from Eng.). It is explained later in the Article.
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demonstrate. The Article also argues and demonstrates in particular
that there is a hard line that divides fundamental changes that are
noninfringing under a proper derivative right analysis (in most cases
because the idea, not the expression, is appropriated), and those that
are noninfringing as transformative fair uses. Finally, the Article
strikes a note of caution specific to appropriation art.
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The lumpish and rather capacious notion of "derivative work,"
added to the US Copyright Act in 1976, is at the very heart of
copyright theory and practice.' Yet thirty-five years after its injection
1. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining "derivative work"); § 103 (making "derivative
works" copyrightable subject matter); § 106(2) (giving copyright owners the right "to prepare
derivative works"). The Author will say more on the importance of the notion in the text
preceding Part I.
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in the statute, serious doubts remain about its scope and purpose.2 If
our understanding of this notion is nebulous, it is not because the
derivative right does not matter-quite the opposite: The scope of the
derivative right directly impacts the range of lawful reuses of a work
or, viewed from across the fence, reuses that a copyright owner can
prohibit.3  This includes several types of online uses and, most
notably, user-generated content (UGC). 4 As such, this Article builds
on work previously published in the Vanderbilt Journal of
Entertainment and Technology Law.5
Not surprising given the importance of the derivative right, a
substantive debate on its purpose and scope has been ongoing in both
courts and scholarly literature since at least the early 1980s.6 This
debate has reached a new level of acuteness with remixes, mash-ups,
and more generally the transition from a professional one-to-many
entertainment infrastructure to a many-to-many-and in large
measure amateur-environment in which financial incentives are
often not a significant motivation for creation.7 Indeterminacy about
the scope of the derivative right may have more perceptible chilling
effects on nonprofessional Internet users because they may not have
the time, desire, or resources to consider or negotiate copyright
2. After years of tergiversations, we are no closer to a workable understanding. As
William Patry noted, "regrettably the understanding of derivative works is fast approaching
incomprehensibility." WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3.46 (2012). Incomprehensible,
perhaps, yet it is also fascinating both intellectually and as a matter of policy for user-generated
content (UGC), appropriation art, and other new forms of cultural expression.
3. Under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), a copyright owner can prohibit the making of derivative
works, which the statute defines in part as works "based upon" the author's work. 17 U.S.C.
§ 101.
4. See Daniel Gervais, The Tangled Web of UGC: Making Copyright Sense of
User-Generated Content, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841, 842-43 (2009).
5. See id.
6. See, e.g., Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574 (6th Cir.
2007) (holding unauthorized sound recordings of music for karaoke infringed); Mulcahy v.
Cheetah Learning LLC, 386 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2004) (reversing summary judgment and
remanding for analysis of derivative-work claim in case involving condensation of test materials);
Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998); Radji v. Khakbaz,
607 F. Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding unauthorized translation of substantial excerpts from
plaintiffs book infringed the derivative right); see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON
COPYRIGHT § 7.3 (3d ed. 2012); Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L.
REV. 1213, 1267 (1997) (proposing inter alia a narrow formulation of the derivative right, in
addition to broader fair use and a possible compulsory license). Professor Wu's article on
complementary works is also thought provoking. See Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 617, 631 (2008) (arguing that complementary works should not be deemed infringing).
7. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Tailoring Copyright to Social Production, 12 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 309, 342-43 (2011). Elkin-Koren suggests that a world in which both true amateur
creators (who do not want to get paid and are not merely thinking there is no practical way to do
so) and professional creators produce content maximizes general welfare. Id. In other words, it is
a world in which our greatest novelists and songwriters do not need a day job. Id.
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rights.8 Hence, what may have been a mostly theoretical debate about
what is protectable (and hence may not be reused without
authorization) when it was a matter for professionals who translated
books, adapted plays or novels for the cinema, and prepared abridged
versions, now affects anyone making and uploading UGC. 9
Courts and scholars need to work harder to foster clarity with
respect to the derivative right, in part to compensate for the US
Copyright Act's unhelpfulness in setting limits. The derivative right
in the statute is open ended in that it includes named derivatives
(which correspond to major, traditionally licensed reuses of
preexisting works such as translations), but also an unbounded
number of other derivations that also require authorization.10 The
Copyright Act defines that part of the right very broadly as a right to
prevent the making of any work "based upon" a preexisting work."
The growth of a vibrant culture, one making full use of the potential of
digital tools to create and disseminate new works (in particular the
potential of the Internet) within a copyright-compatible framework, is
at stake.12
Beyond the risks that exercising a vague right entails for users,
a more theoretical reason why clarity is crucial is that the derivative
right lies at the core of copyright theory. It is situated at the essential
border between infringement and inspiration. Drawing its limits is
thus an inevitable step of any effort to develop an understanding of
what uses and reuses are allowed. The task is to explicate, define, and
properly cabin the derivative right.13 This is not a debate about
semantics; it is about the ability of a copyright owner to prevent
others from creating by reusing nonliteral parts of her work. More
specifically, the doctrinal and normative challenge is two-fold: first, to
define the derivative right properly, which would seem to presuppose
a good understanding of its foundations and purpose; and second, to
develop an adequate test to implement the right thus delineated.
To achieve these dual objectives, and in light of the relative
paucity of statutory guidance, this Article looks for answers in
8. See id. at 344-46.
9. See Daniel Gervais, User-Generated Content and Music File-Sharing: A Look at
Some of the More Interesting Aspects of Bill C-32, in FROM "RADICAL EXTREMISM" TO "BALANCED
COPYRIGHT": CANADIAN COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL AGENDA 447, 467-72 (Michael Geist ed.,
2010).
10. See Voegtli, supra note 6, at 1267.
11. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining "derivative work"); see also infra note 95 and
accompanying text.
12. Another important area of culture directly impacted by the definition of the
derivative right is appropriation art. See infra Part V.
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
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international and other comparative sources that have been grappling
with a notion of adaptation or derivation for much longer than the US
statute.14 The current US approach, as Part L.A explains, is
essentially to subsume reuses of copyrighted material under the
reproduction right, thus creating a complete overlap with the
idea-expression dichotomy and leaving very little work for the
derivative right, in spite of the broad statutory language. Yet
Congress specifically carved out forms of reuse and identified them as
derivative uses-some of which fall outside the scope of the
reproduction right. That must mean something. This Article suggests
that we should apply different analyses to reuses that transform the
content used, in ways Part II defines, versus other cases of
reproduction. Otherwise, the statute's definition of "derivative work,"
and the inclusion of a derivative right in 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), is
meaningless.15
Another view in the literature is that, in functional terms, the
role of the derivative right is a tool to catch unfixed derivatives, for
instance performances.16 This jars with the importance of many of the
named derivatives in the statute (e.g., translations). It perhaps
follows from the confusion that one can infringe the derivative right
without fixation of the infringing derivative use, but one cannot get a
copyright in a derivative work without both fixation and an absence of
infringement.'7 This confusion has made it very difficult to find the
normative foundations of the right. One needs a better understanding
14. As the Author compares international law, including French and German
approaches to derivation, to the US approach, differences will emerge that illuminate the notion
of derivative right. The Berne Convention, to which the United States adhered in 1988, only
mentions "derivative works" in the title of Article 2(3), which reads: "Translations, adaptations,
arrangements of music and other alterations of a literary or artistic work shall be protected as
original works without prejudice to the copyright in the original work." Berne Convention for the
Protection of Artistic and Literary Works art. 2(3), Sept. 9, 1886, revised by Paris Act on July 24,
1971 (amended July 24, 1979), 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]
(emphasis added), available at www.wipo.int/treaties/enlipfberne/pdf/trtdocs-woOOl.pdf. This is
examined in Part IIB, but one can already see that the Berne notion is, compared to the US
statute, open by including the notion of "other alterations."
15. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103, 106(2).
16. To be protected as a work in its own right, a derivative work must be "fixed in a
tangible medium of expression." Id. § 102(a). However, § 106(2) does not require that the work be
fixed in order to infringe. Id. § 106(2). As noted in the House Report, "reproduction requires
fixation in copies or phonorecords, whereas the preparation of a derivative work, such as a ballet,
pantomime, or improvised performance, may be an infringement even though nothing is ever
fixed in tangible form." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62 (1976) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5675.
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (fixation); see also infra note 351 and accompanying text
(stating an author need not infringe to get a separate copyright in the derivative work).
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of the purpose of the right-whether as a subset of the reproduction
right or otherwise.18
The very language of the statute describing the derivative right
(any work "based upon" a preexisting work) points to a broad notion
and seems textually at odds with the minuscule purpose of the
right-that is, mostly as a safety net to catch unfixed performances.19
More importantly, and this further explains the analytical approach in
this Article, US law is different from many other national laws, which
do not require fixation as a condition of protection and where using
the derivative right to catch unfixed reuses thus makes little sense.20
In most industrialized countries other than the United States, seeing
the derivative right as a corrective measure designed to prohibit
performances or protect them as derivative works is plainly wrong
because musical performances are protected not as copyrighted works
but rather by a neighboring right specific to performers.21
Against this backdrop, this Article argues that the derivative
right is, and should be, more than a safety net to catch unfixed
performances and a few other mostly marginal uses. Using both a
comparative and international perspective, this Article attempts to
demonstrate that the evolution of the derivative right both in the
United States and in other jurisdictions teaches that, while the rights
of reproduction and derivation self-evidently overlap, they have
distinct targets and normative foundations and, perhaps more
importantly for our purposes, respond to different tests. This Article
contends that one should be able to identify those tests now, because
the level of difficulty will increase as cases concerning UGC (and new
forms of appropriation art) emerge in greater numbers.
In addition to the Berne Convention,22 the main international
copyright instrument, this Article uses comparative sources from
three major jurisdictions-France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom-to illustrate the role that a properly conceived derivative
right can play, and how different it is from its reproduction-right
cousin.23
18. See infra notes 311-315 and accompanying text.
19. See Yoav Mazeh, Modifying Fixation: Why Fixed Works Need to be Archived to
Justify the Fixation Requirement, 8 LOY. L. & TECH. ANN. 109, 113-17 (2009).
20. See id.
21. This is true in both international law and a majority of national copyright laws. See
Michael Gruenberger, A Duty to Protect the Rights of Performers? Constitutional Foundations of
an Intellectual Property Right, 24 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 617, 627-28 (2006).
22. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in
Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991 (1990). Ginsburg explained:
The French and U.S. copyright systems are well known as opposites. The product of
the French Revolution, French copyright law is said to enshrine the author: exclusive
790 [Vol. 15:4:785
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In French, a derivative work is known as "une ouvre ddrivie."24
The verb ddriver can mean "to derive" but also "to drift." This
double-entendre is applicable here, for when copyright drifts too far
from its normative moorings, it risks encountering the shoals of free
expression and creating obstacles to cultural and economic progress.
At the risk of pushing the metaphor a bridge too far, the notion of
derivative work is at dangerous cross-currents as we define the space
available for Internet users to reuse, remix, modify, and make
available audiovisual and audio content such as mash-ups,
sampling-based sound recordings, and fan sites, to name just three
examples.25 This debate may well be a battle royal in shaping
tomorrow's culture.
rights flow from one's (preferred) status as a creator. For example, a leading French
copyright scholar states that one of the "fundamental ideas" of the revolutionary
copyright laws is the principle that "an exclusive right is conferred on authors because
their property is the most justified since it flows from their intellectual creation." By
contrast, the U.S. Constitution's copyright clause, echoing the English Statute of
Anne, makes the public's interest equal, if not superior, to the author's. This clause
authorizes the establishment of exclusive rights of authors as a means to maximize
production of and access to intellectual creations.
Pursuing this comparison, one might observe that post-revolutionary French laws and
theorists portray the existence of an intimate and almost sacred bond between
authors and their works as the source of a strong literary and artistic property right.
Thus, France's leading modern exponent of copyright theory, the late Henri Desbois,
grandly proclaimed: "The author is protected as an author, in his status as a creator,
because a bond unites him to the object of his creation. In the French tradition,
Parliament has repudiated the utilitarian concept of protecting works of authorship in
order to stimulate literary and artistic activity."
By contrast, Anglo-American exponents of copyright law and policy often have viewed
the author's right grudgingly.
Id. at 991-92.
24. (Euvre is usually translated as "work."
25. The issue is not new, though new tools allow Internet users to create ever more
creative derivatives. See Lydia Pallas Loren, The Changing Nature of Derivative Works in the
Face of New Technologies, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 57, 58-59 (2000). Loren described
technology's effect on the derivative right:
Digital technology creates ample opportunity for individuals to create new works
based on old works. The ease of copying and manipulating digital works, whether they
are text, images, or sounds, raises a complex and somewhat metaphysical issue
concerning the point at which those works move from being infringing derivative
works to being non-infringing new works of authorship.
Id. at 58. The Author discussed the emergence of self-expressive content on the Internet in an
earlier Article published in this Journal:
[It is now widely accepted that there is such a thing as the "participative web," or
Web 2.0 (soon to be 3.0). These terms refer to an Internet-based network of content
and services that use increasingly intelligent software capable of empowering Internet
users to develop, rate, collaborate on, and distribute content, as well as to customize
Internet applications. As the Internet becomes more embedded in peoples' lives, they
draw on new Internet applications to express themselves through content that they
upload or make available. Life stories are written on Facebook as they happen.
Gervais, supra note 4, at 843.
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This Article proceeds as follows: Part I enunciates the context
for the subsequent analysis, first by explaining the emergence and
expansion of the derivative right in the US statute and then by
contextualizing the right within the framework of copyright policy.
This includes an inventory of "known quantities" in the debate. Part
II proposes principles that inform the rest of the analysis and
demonstrates why this analysis is correct. Part III considers how
major international instruments treat derivative works. Part IV looks
at French and German doctrine and cases to see whether there are
lessons one can import in understanding the right. Finally, Part V
brings the various threads of analysis together, suggests the ways in
which the notion of derivative work should be interpreted in the
United States, and hopefully convinces the reader that the principles
enunciated below are correct.
I. THE DERIVATIVE RIGHT IN CONTEXT
A. Emergence of the Derivative Right in the US Copyright Act
The derivative right is the result of an evolution that started in
the 1870 Copyright Act, with the realization that copyright could be
infringed by making something other than exact, "piratical" copies.26
Indeed, introducing a right against unauthorized translations and
dramatizations implied that something protectable lay beneath a
work's literal surface.27 What now may seem obvious was in fact a
major shift. It opened up a new path for copyright under which
substantial as well as literal copies could infringe.28 It also created a
26. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198; Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights
and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 209, 214 (1983). As a
commentator explained:
Congress responded to a Supreme Court decision that had upheld the right of a
German author to translate Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin by explicitly
adding the right of translation to the bundle of exclusive rights guaranteed to a
copyright owner. While the 1870 Act provided that "authors may reserve the right to
dramatize or to translate their own works," Congress went even further in 1909,
adding novelization and musicalization to the expanding list of derivative rights for
copyright holders.
Frank Houston, The Transformation Test: Artistic Expression, Fair Use, and the Derivative
Right, 6 FIU L. REV. 123, 133-34 (2010). In Folsom v. Marsh, Justice Story opened the door by
considering whether an adaptation infringed copyright. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901); R. Anthony Reese, The Story of Folsom v. Marsh: Distinguishing
Between Infringing and Legitimate Uses, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 259 (Jane C.
Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006). On the use of "piracy" to signify copyright
infringement, see WILLIAM F. PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 90-94 (2009).
27. See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 32-33 (1967).
28. Actually, the normative foundation for the extension beyond literal copying may be
traced back to Folsom, which provided the intellectual wedge for considering the impact of
792 [Vol. 15:4:785
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climate hospitable to a significant expansion of copyright, which a
growing international trade in translated books then accelerated.29
That trade facilitated the expansion of the translation right of course,
but also of the right to adapt books and other works for the theater.30
Four decades later, the 1909 Copyright Act3 l reflected this
continuing expansion of copyright (beyond literal copying), though it
did not contain the notion of "derivative work" as such.32 Instead,
consistent with British and Commonwealth practice,33 it contained a
less-than-literal copies on the reproduction right. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 349. As explicated by the
Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), "[t]he central purpose
of this investigation is to see, in Justice Story's words, whether the new work merely
'supersede [s] the objects' of the original creation." Id. at 579. By focusing on harm to the "object"
of the work, an intellectual path was laid to harm well beyond literal copying. See GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 6, § 7.3.
29. That climate led to an amendment introduced in both the House and Senate in the
58th Congress in 1903 providing that if an author of a foreign-published book obtained copyright
for a translation within twelve months of its first publication, then the author would enjoy "the
sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, vending, translating, and dramatizing the said
book, and, in the case of a dramatic composition, of publicly performing the same, or of causing it
to be performed or represented by others." THORVALD SOLBERG, COPYRIGHT IN CONGRESS
1789-1904, at 8 (1905). On the issue of foreign books, a much more limited Act was eventually
passed and signed by the President on January 7, 1904. See Act of Jan. 7, 1904, ch. 2, 33 Stat. 4.
There was a lively debate in Congress and apparent opposition to protecting foreign works.
Representative Payne inquired whether people could "bring in books and works of art,
photographs, etc. that could not now be copyrighted under the law under pretense of exhibition."
SOLBERG, supra, at 371-72. The bill passed unanimously, however. Id. at 370. The Author offers
many thanks to Paul Goldstein for this insight.
30. Paul Geller, asking whether Hiroshige could have sued Vincent Van Gogh for using
some of his paintings as "background" for his Japonaiseries, noted the following in that regard:
In the eighteenth century, copyright was instituted to deal only with easy cases, the
pirate reprinting of books or restaging of plays. At the start of the nineteenth century,
courts typically found no infringement in what leading French commentary called
"[t]he transmutation of form that the translator causes the original to undergo." But
in the course of that century, as trade in books became increasingly globalized,
authors and publishers started to claim rights to stop translations in foreign markets.
Ultimately, the right of translation was subsumed under the more general right to
control the making and exploitation of derivative works. The scope of copyright was
effectively expanded beyond protecting prior works against substitution by later
works in the markets that the prior works targeted. Copyright reached new markets
in new media, for example, as literary works were adapted to the stage or film.
Paul Edward Geller, Hiroshige vs. Van Gogh: Resolving the Dilemma of Copyright Scope in
Remedying Infringement, 46 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 39, 46-47 (1998).
31. Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (1909) (repealed 1976).
32. See Goldstein, supra note 26, at 214-15. While the 1909 Act did not use the words
"derivative work," the reference to "other versions" is often considered to be a precursor of the
derivative right in the 1976 Act. See id.
33. See, e.g., Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 16 (U.K.) ("The owner of
the copyright in a work has, in accordance with the following provisions of this Chapter, the
exclusive right to do the following acts in the United Kingdom- . . . (e) to make an adaptation of
the work or do any of the above in relation to an adaptation."). Section 21(3) defines "adaptation"
as follows:
(a) in relation to a literary or dramatic work, means-
(i) a translation of the work;
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finite list of types of "adaptations" requiring an authorization.34 This
included the right to make abridgements and translations; to
dramatize a nondramatic work; to arrange or adapt a musical work;
and to complete, execute, and finish a model or a design for a work of
art.35
This expansion of the scope of protected uses is visible in case
law as well: courts increasingly protected nonliteral uses by relying on
an expanded notion of reproduction, though occasionally filtering out
noninfringing adaptations.36 C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan provides a good
(ii) a version of a dramatic work in which it is converted into a non-dramatic
work or, as the case may be, of a non-dramatic work in which it is converted into
a dramatic work;
(iii) a version of the work in which the story or action is conveyed wholly or
mainly by means of pictures in a form suitable for reproduction in a book, or in a
newspaper, magazine or similar periodical;
(b) in relation to a musical work, means an arrangement or transcription of the work.
Id. § 21(3); see also Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, § 3(1) (Can.) (using a similar
approach, though with some differences); Copyright Act 1968 §§ 10(1), 31(1)(vi) (Austl.) (defining
"adaptation").
34. The 1909 Act granted a translation right in § 1(b):
[Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this Act, shall
have the exclusive right: ...
(b) To translate the copyrighted work into other languages or dialects, or make any
other version thereof, if it be a literary work; to dramatize it if it be a nondramatic
work; to convert it into a novel or other nondramatic work if it be a drama; to arrange
or adapt it if it be a musical work; to complete, execute, and finish it if it be a model or
design for a work of art.
Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1(b), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (repealed 1976). The term "adaptation" is
preferred internationally, but it covers essentially the same scope as derivation in the US
statute. See infra Parts III-IV.
35. Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1(b), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (repealed 1976); see also Goldstein,
supra note 26, at 214-16. 'The 1909 Act not only identified specific types of derivatives that
authors were entitled to control; it also tied each type of derivative to the type of work being
adapted." Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright's Derivative Work
Right 6 (UC Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 2138479, 2012) (emphasis added), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2138479.
36. Hence, they found binding and rebinding of books noninfringing because a binding
or similar operation does not lead to a reproduction, at least not if reproduction is defined by its
result, namely an increase in the number of copies in existence. See Doan v. Am. Book Co., 105 F.
772 (7th Cir. 1901); Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689 (2d Cir. 1894). The right did
not extend to copying missing pages, however. See Ginn & Co. v. Apollo Publ'g Co., 215 F. 772
(E.D. Pa. 1914). The courts' findings derived in part from the competing ownership rights in the
copy, which implies a right to maintain or restore the copy's condition. See Harrison, 61 F. at
777. Although binding was allowed, even if a work was combined with others in the process, it
was not allowed when it amounted to a recompilation of works previously compiled in a different
way, such as the separation of articles in magazines to publish a book. See Fawcett Publ'ns, Inc.
v. Elliot Publ'g Co., 46 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Classified
Geographic, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 655 (D. Mass. 1939). In British law, reproduction and
"multiplication" were different concepts. See Fine Arts Copyright Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 68,
§ 1 (Eng.) (granting authors "the sole and exclusive right of copying, engraving, reproducing, and
multiplying") (emphasis added); see also Bradbury, Agnew & Co. v. Day, (1916) 32 T.L.R. 349
(Eng.).
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example of a pre-1978 case (the 1976 Act entered into force on
January 1, 197837).38 The owner of pictures imprinted on stationery
and greeting cards brought the case against the manufacturer of wall
plaques that incorporated the stationery and greeting cards.39 The
district court held that the transfer to ceramic plaques did not
constitute "copying," adding, "without copying there can be no
infringement of copyright."40 A closer reading of the cases, however,
shows that the court conflated copying with the need to identify a
parasitical use or misappropriation, and specifically with whether the
reuse of the work would "kill the host."4 1 This is reminiscent of the
37. See Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 ("This Act becomes
effective on January 1, 1978, except as otherwise expressly provided by this Act. . . .").
38. C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex. 1973); see also Affiliated
Enters., Inc. v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958 (1st Cir. 1936); Blazon, Inc. v. DeLuxe Game Corp., 268 F.
Supp. 416, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Conversely, adaptations that copied a preexisting work, even if
material was added or deleted, were generally considered infringing. See Addison-Wesley Publ'g
Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) (finding book containing solutions to physics
textbook problems infringing). A number of commentators consider Addison-Wesley problematic
in that the book held to be infringing published solutions without reproducing the problems. See
Case Comment, Solutions to Questions in a Copyrighted Physics Textbook Held an Infringement,
112 U. PA. L. REV. 1070, 1070-71 (1964) (discussing how finding copying is a "difficulty" because
the "manual of solutions contained little actual lifting of plaintiffs' language" but ultimately
concluding that the facts should be enough to support a claim of unfair competition, if not unfair
use); see also JANE C. GINSBURG & ROBERT A. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW 148 (2012). Some
scholars seem to reconcile Addison-Wesley's holding. See Goldstein, supra note 26, at 209
("[C]opyright has historically prohibited utilitarian uses, from the copying of telephone and
business directories to the publication of a book providing solutions to physics problems
appearing in plaintiffs copyrighted text."); see also Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d
Cir. 1976) (involving edited versions of Monty Python sketches).
39. See C.M Paula Co., 355 F. Supp. at 190.
40. Id. at 191. The Supreme Court of Canada heard a very similar case. See Thiberge v.
Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336 (Can.). The ink from paper posters of
copyrighted works had been transferred to canvas. See id. A split court held that no reproduction
had taken place because there had been no net increase in the number of copies in existence. See
id. For a comment, see Daniel J. Gervais, The Purpose of Copyright Law in Canada, 2 U.
OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 315, 319-21 (2005), available at http://uoltj.ca/articles/vol2.2/2005.2.2.
uoltj.Gervais.315-356.pdf.
41. In C.M. Paula Co., the court, finding no infringement, suggests the use comes close
to the limit of unacceptable appropriation and "is of the opinion that some action should be taken
to insure that no confusion exists in the marketplace as to the source of defendant's product." 355
F. Supp. at 192-93 (citing Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924)); see also, Nat'l
Geographic Soc'y, 27 F. Supp. at 655. In addition, the district court in Addison- Wesley noted:
Of preponderant importance to the Court in evaluating the merits in doubtful cases so
that it may arrive at its decision with a minimum of "ad hoc" and a maximum of legal
justification is the recognition by it of "the economic philosophy behind the
(constitutional) clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights." That
philosophy persuades "that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
'Science and useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve
rewards commensurate with the services rendered."
It is clear that defendants' parasitical excrescence upon plaintiffs' distinguished and
useful works profits defendants alone. In this symbiosis defendants thrive, while their
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Folsom inquiry, well known at the time, which focuses on the
economic outcomes rather than on ethical or behavioral aspects of
copyright infringement, namely appropriations that affect or
supersede the market for the primary work.42
The process of expansion of the derivative right continued.
When the long march to the 1976 reforms began, the Register of
Copyrights suggested a definition of the reproduction right as
inclusive of certain kinds of derivatives, a significant overlap that was
also apparent in the congressional record.43 Overlap did not mean
identity, however. Indeed, by the mid-1960s, the "derivative right"
had been named as a separate right.44  In 1976, it finally made its
grand entrance in the statute.45
manual kills the host it feeds upon. The Court sees nothing here warranting the
exercise by it of an exigent astuteness to ferret out some legal justification for
defendants' overuse of plaintiffs' copyrighted material. If the issue is at all
doubtful-and in the Court's view it does not appear to be-such doubt should, in good
conscience and in fulfillment of the constitutional mandate, be resolved in plaintiffs'
favor.
Addison-Wesley, 223 F. Supp. at 228 (emphasis added).
42. This notion of "killing the host" indeed seems a logical kin of the notion of
supersession espoused by Judge Story in Folsom v. Marsh:
[We must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature and objects of
the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in
which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects,
of the original work.
9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (emphasis added); see also supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
43. Samuelson, supra note 35, at 20 n.62. The process to draft and pass the new Act
lasted approximately thirty years. Id. at 5-13.
44. Id. at 2 n.10.
45. The statute refers to derivative works as works "based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form
in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis
added). Essentially, the statute (a) enumerates named derivatives, and (b) opens up a broader,
undefined category of works "based upon" previous works. See id. Although both are anchored in
the opening "based upon" language, they do explicate it. The list provided in the statute is useful
on at least two levels: normatively and perhaps more mechanically also under the ejusdem
generis canon of construction, according to which, "[wlhere general words follow specific words in
a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in
nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words." Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114-15 (2001). It is normatively useful because the difficulty mainly
resides in the "based upon" language combined with the open-ended phrase "or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101. As Paul Goldstein has
noted, "the derivative author's transformation of the primary work need not be extensive." See
Goldstein, supra note 26, at 210.
796
2013] THE DERIVATIVE RIGHT 797
B. Contextualizing the Derivative Right in Copyright Policy
The necessity of serving the purpose of copyright has generated
a number of doctrines to limit the scope of what copyright protects.
These are best viewed as a group of safeguards to allow the optimal
"Progress of Science and useful Arts" that the Constitution establishes
as the purpose of copyright (and patent) law.4 6 For example, copyright
doctrine, both in the United States and internationally, teaches that
the expression of a work is protected, but not the underlying
ideas-the so-called idea-expression dichotomy.47 This doctrine, often
elevated to the level of principle, goes back to the origins of copyright
in the common-law world. For example, in an 1847 case, an English
court noted the following:
The right to multiply copies of what is written or printed, and to take therefor whatever
other possessions mankind is willing to give in exchange, constitutes the whole claim of
literary property. This claim leaves wholly undisturbed the opportunity of every reader
to make an intellectual appropriation of the ideas suggested to him by the characters
which he purchases.4 8
A number of infringement-related doctrines further limit the
"copy-right," 49 including the need to show substantial similarity
between the plaintiffs and defendant's works and the exclusion of de
minimis copying.s0
46. U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
47. The idea-expression dichotomy separates two seemingly mutually exclusive and
watertight notional universes, which is reflected both in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) and the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 9(2), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. As Paul Geller explained:
In hard cases, plaintiffs allege that defendants have derived works from their own. In
such cases, courts often resort to complementary doctrines to limit copyright scope.
These doctrines operate on theoretically distinct levels of analysis that tend to come
together in practice. On the level of determining what is protectible, there is the
principle that courts may not protect "ideas" or "facts," but rather only "expression" or
"forms." On the level of finding infringement, courts ask whether plaintiffs work is
copied in defendant's "substantially" similar work or whether "essential" or
"characteristic traits" of one work are taken in the other. But such notions as "ideas"
defy ready definition, and equally metaphysical notions of "substance" suggest that
works of the mind are things like tables and chairs, consistently perceived by all
audiences, but none of these doctrines by itself guides courts to consistent decisions.
Geller, supra note 30, at 47.
48. GEORGE T. CURTIS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 11 (1847).
49. In most other languages, especially in legal systems inspired by Civil (Roman) law,
the corresponding term is "author's rights" and connotes a different historical background and
set of underlying principles, though one which may have been overstated. See Ginsburg, supra
note 23, at 991-92 (noting that the difference of underlying principles was overstated, at least as
a matter of eighteenth- to early nineteenth-century copyright).
50. Of course fair use is directly relevant in allowing reuse that constitutes prima facie
infringement, which is a greater social purpose served by the transformative nature of the use.
See infra Part V.
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Considering those copyright-limiting doctrines together as
forming a variegated policy collage-a counterweight to the rights
contained in 17 U.S.C. § 106, as it were-one can posit that there
must be an optimal point of protection. That is, a point must exist
where enough protection is granted to create the level of ex post
reward (or to create an ex ante incentive) to generate new works, but
not excessive protection, which would prevent other authors from
generating their own works.51 Theoretically at least, equilibrium
must be possible. As a normative matter, one must seek to establish
it.5 2
The introduction of the open-ended derivative right did not
make achieving this balance any simpler. Indeed, the statute's
prohibition of the reuse of protected works beyond literal copying (by
giving the owner of copyright in a work an exclusive right to prohibit
the making of any work "based upon" her work) seems a major
expansion of copyright's reach over the speech of others.53 At first
glance, this right (as formulated in the 1976 Act) makes little sense
51. The US Copyright Act contains the basic copyright rights, namely the right of
reproduction, distribution, public performance (and the related right in digital transmissions of
sound recordings), public display, and of course the right to prepare derivative works. See 17
U.S.C. § 106 (2006). A more complete utilitarian perspective that directly impacts the analysis of
derivative works would include the development of potential secondary markets for the protected
work and the facilitation of optimal means of development and dissemination. See id.; Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 308 (1996).
52. In Nash v. CBS, Judge Easterbrook noted:
Intellectual (and artistic) progress is possible only if each author builds on the work of
others. No one invents even a tiny fraction of the ideas that make up our cultural
heritage. Once a work has been written and published, any rule requiring people to
compensate the author slows progress in literature and art, making useful
expressions "too expensive," forcing authors to re-invent the wheel, and so on. Every
work uses scraps of thought from thousands of predecessors, far too many to
compensate even if the legal system were frictionless, which it isn't. Because any new
work depends on others even if unconsciously, broad protection of intellectual
property also creates a distinct possibility that the cost of litigation--old authors
trying to get a "piece of the action" from current successes-will prevent or penalize
the production of new works, even though the claims be rebuffed.
Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990).
53. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(2); Nash, 899 F.2d at 1540. Christina Bohannan explained
how this is germane to the issue at hand:
Given that a derivative work must only be "based on" an existing work and that it
gives the copyright holder the exclusive right of "fictionalization," the derivative works
right would seem to prohibit taking facts from a non-fiction historical work and
making a fictional work out of them. Under this interpretation, Dan Brown's The Da
Vinci Code would infringe the historical work Holy Blood, Holy Grail, even if it took
no copyrighted expression. Yet, under the idea/expression dichotomy, codified at
§ 102(b), ideas and facts are not copyrightable; only the author's expression may be
copyrighted. Some judicial decisions have attempted to resolve this ambiguity by
applying a narrowing interpretation that limits the derivative works right to uses that
actually incorporate copyrighted expression.
Christina Bohannan, Taming the Derivative Works Right: A Modest Proposal for Reducing
Overbreadth and Vagueness in Copyright, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 669, 677-78 (2010).
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because most if not all new works are based upon preexisting ones in
one way or another.54 Most authors do not take from "nature" (though
perhaps an artist does when painting or photographing a natural
scene); authors take from each other and all those who created before
them and made their work available for others to enjoy.5 5 Humanity,
as Blaise Pascal once said, "is but one person who continually
grows."56
While the right to prohibit the making of derivative works
must mean something, however, a hugely expansive reading of a right
to prevent any work "based upon" a preexisting work (as found in 17
U.S.C. § 101) seems both exaggerated and unwarranted. For one
thing, it could be read to deny many new expressions of human
creativity. That, this Article contends, is not the target of the right.
When copyright moved doctrinally beyond literal copying,57 the
underlying concern was the (correct) realization that other
appropriations, including translation, dramatizations, and substantial
(if not literal) copying, could cause an unjustified harm to a copyright
holder.58
Does that mean that the derivative right is the same as or
entirely subsumed under reproduction? The simple answer is
no-unless one is prepared to violate a basic canon of statutory
construction.59 Yet a number of commentators have argued that the
right to prohibit the making of derivatives is essentially useless and
subsumed under the reproduction right (and in some cases the right of
public performance as well). This position leaves only a few marginal
cases for the derivative right, such as when a license allows copying
but reserves the making of certain derivatives.60 Professor Nimmer,
54. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966 (1990) ("[The very
act of authorship in any medium is more akin to translation and recombination than it is to
creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea."). Phillip Page explained:
One cannot write without using letters or language, paint without colors and forms, or
compose without notes and structures that have been previously created. Even where
preceded by no mortal hand or eye, the sculptor may employ the grain of the wood or
the composer may seek to integrate the babble of a brook. Of course, drawing from a
common stock of elements is not what makes for a derivative work under the statute
or as the term is commonly used.
Phillip Edward Page, The Works: Distinguishing Derivative Creations Under Copyright, 5
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 415, 418 (1986).
55. See ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS 6-12 (1993).
56. Gervais, supra note 4, at 845.
57. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
59. Basic canons of statutory interpretation counsel against courts "reading out"
statutory language. See, e.g., GEORGE COSTELLO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 12 (2006) ("[S]tatutes should be
construed 'so as to avoid rendering superfluous' any statutory language.").
60. 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.09[A] (2010).
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whose copyright treatise is widely cited by US courts, specifically
argued that the derivative right is superfluous because an
infringement of the right infringes either the right of reproduction or
the right of public performance.6 1 This Article disagrees, but does
concede that a number of US courts have applied the "substantial
similarity" test to allegedly infringing derivative works in the same
way they have applied it to alleged infringements of the reproduction
right.62 Perhaps superfluity was part of the congressional intent at
the time of the 1976 reform.63 The statute makes plain, however, that
the derivative right targets specific reuses of protected works. This
will become clear in light of the purpose of the derivative right in
international conventions and national laws examined below.64 To
argue that some of them are also reproductions does not add
normative clarity-quite the opposite. Courts should consider reuses
that Congress identified as within the derivative right under that
right. Part V explains in more detail how to parse the distinction.
This Article thus acknowledges the overlap but endeavors to
separate the two rights. This means that there are forms of derivation
that copy and some that do not. Conversely, there are forms of
copying that derive, and others that "merely" copy. As alluded to
above, the derivative right, properly applied and understood, is
situated in a zone between (and occasionally beyond) reproduction, on
61. See id. This view was cited, apparently with approval, in Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v.
Publ'as Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1373 n.6 (2d Cir. 1993); see also J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD
COPYRIGHT LAW § 9.04 (2d ed. 1989) ("It could be said that all adaptations involve reproduction,
where the essential features of the adapted work are used. However, in many laws (and under
the Berne Convention) the right of adaptation is viewed separately from that of reproduction.").
62. See GINSBURG & GORMAN, supra note 38, at 146-47.
63. See id.
64. The Author also concedes that the House Report accompanying the changes to the
statute in 1976 did little to allay the concerns expressed by those who saw much overlap between
the two rights:
To be an infringement the "derivative work" must be "based upon the copyrighted
work," and the definition in section 101 refers to "a translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted." Thus, to constitute a violation of section 106 (2), the
infringing work must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some form; for
example, a detailed commentary on a work or a programmatic musical composition
inspired by a novel would not normally constitute infringements under this clause.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62 (1976) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5675 (emphasis
added). As Page noted, the possibly infelicitous drafting of the new derivative right and its
"approximate" relation to the right of reproduction was criticized early on:
It is, however, the Act's introduction of new copyright concepts which presents the
greatest potential source of difficulty for the derivative artist and his transferees.
These provisions, even where their salutary effect is generally conceded, have made
changes in the enjoyment of rights which may not have been fully anticipated by the
drafters.
Page, supra note 54, at 417.
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the one hand, and uses that are inspired by, but not infringing
(because they are not "based upon"), an earlier work, on the other
hand.65
C. Known Quantities
At least two building blocks seem indisputable as our
analytical journey enters its next phase. First, many national
copyright laws including the US statute identify specific types of
derivatives.66 The US Copyright Act identifies "translation[s], musical
arrangement[s], dramatization[s], fictionalization[s], motion picture
version[s], sound recording[s], art reproduction[s], abridgment[s], and
condensation[s]" as well as "work[s] consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications."67  This Article
refers to these as named derivatives. They help us understand the
notion but do not fully define it.
A second initial contextual element-but one that is
particularly important-is that a derivative work transforms or
recasts something protectable in the primary work (something other
than the unprotected ideas) by adding or transforming it.68 This
65. See Timothy Everett Nielander, The Mighty Morphin Ninja Mallard: The Standard
for Analysis of Derivative Work Infringement in the Digital Age, 4 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1
(1997). Nielander described that zone as follows:
On the continuum between an exact reproduction of protected property, and the
creation of an original work, lies a gray zone. This zone is a mixture of protected
works-printed art, art on digital media, digital and analog music, and other works
recognized as deserving intellectual property protection-that can be mixed and
matched with other works to create new works. American law recognizes protection of
this form of copying as derivative rights.
Id. at 2.
66. Section 101 of the US Copyright Act mentions "translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
67. Id.
68. A derivative work, if it is created, must self-evidently be a "work," since the
Copyright Act only protects "original works of authorship." See id. § 102(a). This is further
confirmed by the last words of the definition of "derivative work." See infra text accompanying
note 72. This does not fully answer the question of course because there is uncertainty about
what exactly can be a work and in particular how small a creative unit can be to qualify. See
Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 578 (2005)
(arguing for a "minimum size principle" in copyright law). As such, it must be original in its own
right. See Kamar Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 1981). The Author
posits that the source of the originality for both works is different, at least in part, typically
because the works have different authors. Even the same author arranging her own work would
make different creative, originality-generating choices for the first (preexisting) and second
(derivative) works. An author could infringe copyright in her own creation if she had transferred
the right to make derivatives thereof to a third party. In the Author's experience, the right to
reuse one's own works is seldom reserved by authors when they transfer copyright. For an actual
example, see Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930 (2d Cir. 1914) ("If the copyrighted picture were
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means (a) that to constitute a (preexisting) work in which copyright
subsists, the primary work must be original;69 and (b) that derivation
(whether or not a new, derivative work results) implies some
additional work by the derivative user.70 In fact, it is that additional
produced with colors on canvas, and were then copyrighted and sold by the artist, he would
infringe the purchaser's rights if thereafter the same artist, using the same model, repainted the
same picture with only trivial variations of detail and offered it for sale."). The harder question is
whether the originality of the derivative work must come entirely from the changes and
additions made by the author of the derivative work. The Author will leave that question for a
future paper.
69. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Entertainment Research Group, Inc. v. Creative
Group, Inc., a derivative work must exhibit its own originality. 122 F.3d 1211, 1220 (9th Cir.
1997). The Ninth Circuit also discussed the applicable test in that case. It was asked to pick
either the Doran test, named after Doran v. Sunset House Distributing Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940
(S.D.Cal. 1961), affd, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir.1962), or the Durham test, named after Durham
Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980). See Entm't Research Grp.. 122 F.3d at
1219-21 (explaining that in the Ninth Circuit also the Durham test governs). It picked the
Durham test because the Doran test "completely fails to take into account the rights of the
holder of the copyright for the underlying work." Entm't Research Grp., 122 F.3d at 1219.
In Durham, the Second Circuit explained the test as follows: "First, to support a copyright
the original aspects of a derivative work must be more than trivial. Second, the original aspects
of a derivative work must reflect the degree to which it relies on preexisting material and must
not in any way affect the scope of any copyright protection in that preexisting material."
Durham, 630 F.2d at 909. This debate, however, is essentially on the scope of the rights of the
owner of primary [or underlying] work, rather than on the need for the author of a derivative
work to make an original contribution, a point on which the cases seem to agree. For a
discussion, see Steven S. Boyd, Deriving Originality in Derivative Works: Considering the
Quantum of Originality Needed to Attain Copyright Protection in a Derivative Work, 40 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 325, 357-58 (2000).
70. In this Article, the Author will use "primary" to refer to a work from which a
derivative is made. Other authors have used "original," which the Author will avoid because it
may be a source of confusion. "Original" is also the term used to describe the necessary
originality that a work must possess to be protected by copyright. See, e.g., infra notes 177, 225
and accompanying text. In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340
(1991), the Supreme Court explained that "originality requires independent creation plus a
modicum of creativity." 499 U.S. at 346. "Because the requirement was distilled from the
Constitution's use of the word 'authors' in the Copyright Clause, the requirement was said to be
constitutionally mandated." Elizabeth F. Judge & Daniel Gervais, Of Silos and Constellations:
Comparing Notions of Originality in Copyright Law, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 375, 389-91
(2009). That modicum of creativity, the generator of originality, stems from creative choices
made by the author, which one might define as:
[Tihose made by a human author which are not dictated by the function of the work,
the method or technique used, or by applicable standards or relevant "good practice."
Literary and artistic works are the result of one or more of three types of choices:
technical choices, those that are essentially dictated by the technique used (e.g., in
painting or photography, or certain forms of poetry); functional choices, those dictated
by the function that a utilitarian work will serve (e.g., a chair must not collapse when
someone is sitting on it); and finally creative choices, those that truly stem from the
author and where, if someone else has produced the work, there would most likely
have been a different result. Intellectual property does not reward the first category
(unless a new technique is invented perhaps); copyright does not reward the second





work that will be protected if other conditions (in particular no
infringement of primary work) are met.71 A translation, for example,
is clearly the result of much intellectual work, though of a different
nature than the composition of the primary work.72 New expression is
required to find that a translation constitutes a (new) original work.73
There is thus a distinction to be made between the targets of the
rights of reproduction and derivation in that the latter necessarily
implies a transformation of, or addition of new expression to, the
expression contained in a primary work.
What else can one say with certainty about the derivative
right? Not much. Indeed, beyond the two known elements just
identified, and which this Article uses as premises for the analysis
that follows, one must proceed with extreme caution. Yet, the
problems that indeterminacy will pose for artists, amateur authors,
and other users justify the quest for better and more complete
answers. Those problems will become more insistent because the
combined use of digital tools and the Internet allow for many new
forms of transformation of copyrighted material, many of which may
seem like prime candidates for the derivative right.74
One can ask the question this way: As new forms of use of
copyrighted works emerge, should we assume that the reach and scope
of the derivative right should grow in parallel fashion?75 It seems safe
71. See Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40,49 (2d Cir.1989) ("[C]opyrights in derivative
works secure protection only for the incremental additions of originality contributed by the
authors of the derivative works.").
72. See CURTIS, supra note 48, at 187 ("[T]he translator impresses upon [the original
subject] matter so much of a new character by his own labor, that the law treats his translation
as a new product."). However, Curtis then flips the coin:
The property of the original author embraces something more than the words in which
his sentiments are conveyed. It includes the ideas and sentiments themselves, the
plan of the work and the mode of treating and exhibiting the subject. In such cases his
right may be invaded in whatever form his own property may be reproduced. The new
language in which his composition is clothed by translation affords only a different
medium of communicating that in which he has an exclusive property; and to attribute
to such a new medium the effect of entire originality, is to declare that a change of
dress alone annihilates the most important subject of his right of property. It reduces
his right to the narrow limits of an exclusive privilege of publishing in that idiom
alone in which he first publishes.
Id. at 292-93 (emphasis added).
73. See id. at 187. The Author is indebted to Professor Tyler Ochoa for this insight.
74. See id.
75. A number of proposals consider not the scope of the right but changes to
infringement doctrines, which in effect would broaden the possibilities of users to reuse content,
in some cases after a period of higher exclusivity. See, e.g., Orit Fischman Afori, Flexible
Remedies as a Means to Counteract Failures in Copyright Law, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1,
5-8 (2011). Afori, for example, argued the following:
[Clases addressing derivative works are a good example of the binary decision-making
approach. Such cases occasionally raise some of copyright law's most basic dilemmas:
how much can a work borrow from a copyrighted work without infringing its
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to assume that not all the normative, doctrinal, and remedial work
need be performed by the definitional effort surrounding the notion of
derivative right offered in this Article. Fair use and First Amendment
free-expression scrutiny, two matters this Article does not address in
full, will still perform a significant part of the work.76 But the same is
true with all copyright rights.77 For example, a specific proposal based
on First Amendment concerns noted that "[i]f it is not a reproduction
but a derivative work, neither an injunction nor damages should be
available. In such cases, however, the copyright holder would not be
left wholly without remedy. Instead, he would have an action for
profit allocation."78  This type of limitation is necessary but does not
copyright? Must the use of the underlying copyrighted work be accomplished through
reproduction in order to infringe? Are there other ways of reliance on copyrighted
works, in addition to reproduction, which are prohibited too? How should a court treat
a derivative work, which adds a significant contribution, but is based on a minimal
taking from the underlying copyrighted work? Do such cases support a fair use
finding? Since courts can only find that there either was or was not an infringement of
copyright, legal distortions may occur.
Id. at 7. Other commentators have taken the opposite view, and at least in one case suggested a
statutory expansion of the right to cover, for example, programs that modify or "filter" movies.
See Patrick W. Ogilvy, Note, Frozen in Time? New Technologies, Fixation, and the Derivative
Work Right, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 687, 706-10 (2006).
[Tihe purposes and policy of copyright law and the derivative work right support a
broader definition of what constitutes infringement. Therefore, the Copyright Act
should be amended to expand the derivative work right, clarifying that movie filters
and other similar types of works that rely on but do not incorporate elements of an
underlying work constitute infringing works.
Id. at 706.
76. See Bohannan, supra note 53 (discussing fair use in the context of derivative works).
The Author returns to First Amendment concerns below. See infra Part V.C. Another possibility
the Author will not dwell upon here is the potential limiting role of a fixation requirement. But
see Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright, Derivative Works and Fixation: Is Galoob a Mirage, or Does the
Form (Gen) of the Alleged Derivative Work Matter?, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 991 (2004) (critiquing the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of
America, Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), which held that derivative works need not be fixed
but must nonetheless be in "concrete or permanent form"). Professor Ochoa concludes:
This contradiction stems from the fact that although the statutory language does not
appear to require fixation, reading the statutory language literally would render
illegal merely imagining a modified version of a copyrighted work. This contradiction
can be eliminated by recognizing that what Congress intended was to prohibit the
public performance of an unfixed derivative work, as well as the reproduction, public
distribution, public performance or public display of a fixed derivative work. Congress'
intent can be fully implemented by holding that the exclusive right to prepare
derivative works is dependent upon, rather than independent of, the other four
exclusive rights.
Id. at 1044.
77. Fair use, to take just that exception, applied to all exclusive rights in 17 U.S.C.
§ 106 (2006).
78. Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112
YALE L.J. 1, 55 (2002). Rubenfeld continues the discussion by taking the specific example from
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), namely 2 Live Crew's "version" of Roy
Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman":
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lie within the scope of the right itself. The same may be said of other
limiting doctrines.7 9
II. PROPOSED PRINCIPLES
This Article suggests six mobilizing principles that inform a
proper analysis of the derivative right. The first three principles are
definitional in nature; the last three are best seen as notes of caution.
While some of these principles follow from the preceding contextual
discussion, the following sections further demonstrate them.
A. Definitional Principles
(1) The derivative right is not coextensive with the right of
reproduction. The two rights undoubtedly overlap, but to make any
sense of the derivative right, it must be considered from its own
perspective, normatively but also operationally. Properly anchored,
the derivative right has its own normative footing and is, or should be,
more than an infringement doctrine designed to catch certain unfixed
derivative uses.80 Indeed, internationally this is beyond cavil. This
principle, as this Article shows, may impact the application and scope
of a properly understood right of reproduction.
The fair use determination functions here as an on-off determinant of liability. If 2
Live Crew's Pretty Woman was a fair use of the preexisting Oh Pretty Woman-a
determination said to turn largely on whether the new song was "transformative" of
the old, both creatively and for purposes of the market-substitution analysis-then
the new song was totally outside the prohibitions of copyright law, leaving the
copyright holder with no claim at all. Conversely, if Pretty Woman was not fair use,
then the copyright holder could receive not only damages, but in principle injunctive
relief as well.
From a First Amendment perspective, this is a doubly wrong result. Pretty Woman
was not the same song as Oh Pretty Woman. It was plainly "transformative," having
not only new lyrics but a completely different sound and feel. Hip-hop 'sampling'
generates new music; that is its virtue. It also steals; that is its vice. Because it was
new music, 2 Live Crew's Pretty Woman should have been categorically protected
from an injunction, regardless of whether it "criticized" the original. But there is no
reason why 2 Live Crew was entitled to reap all the profits from its transformative
use of Oh Pretty Woman, when some of those profits were unquestionably attributable
to Roy Orbison's immensely popular tune.
Id. at 55-56.
79. The Supreme Court noted in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388
(2006), that a court could and perhaps should examine whether "the public interest would not be
disserved by" the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Id. at 391. That case involved a patent,
but the principle was extended to copyright in Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 78 n.7 (2d Cir.
2010). It is also relevant to note that it was then extended to trademark cases in N.Y.C.
Triathlon, LLC v. NYC Triathlon Club, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 2d 305, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The
principle, which seems well anchored in the equitable nature of the remedy, is thus now well
established across all major intellectual property rights.
80. Under US law, the fixation requirement does not apply to derivative works; they
must still be in "concrete" form. See Ochoa, supra note 76, at 1044.
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(2) A derivative work implies a transformation of or addition to
the (protected) expression of a primary work. If a derivative
intellectual production is fixed and original (that is, if it meets the
constitutionally entrenched test of a modicum of creativity in the
United States), it can be a work in its own right.81
(3) There must be sufficient proximity between the primary work
and the derivative use or work. This may be the most important
principle, and one Parts III and IV explicate. Specifically, this Article
suggests that proximity follows from the reuse of the elements that
gave the primary work its originality. This proximity is required to
trigger the application of the derivative right. The distinction between
reproduction and derivation is thus that, rather than being merely
copied, parts of the protected expression of the primary work are
transferred to, and transformed in, the product of the derivative use.
This may, but does not have to, imply a reproduction.
This principle reconciles the notion of derivative work with
guidance from Congress and several historical sources. These sources
indicate that one should look for an unlawful taking or the
appropriation of something in the underlying work that made it a
protected work in the first place.82 The principle is also consonant with
traditional copyright doctrine, for it is well established that protection
by copyright is rooted in originality, and courts often use the scope of
the original expression in a protected work to decide whether a
81. Originality is the worldwide standard, though not always defined in Feistian terms.
See Daniel J. Gervais, Feist Goes Global: A Comparative Analysis of the Notion of Originality in
Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 949 (2002). The existence of originality in
borderline cases may be shown by demonstrating that two authors in similar situations (tools,
instructions, function of the work, knowledge of applicable standards and practices) would
produce substantially different results. See id. at 965 n.98. The sources of the originality of the
primary and derivative work are different, usually because different authors are involved, but
even if the same author prepares the derivative work, the sources differ due to the temporal
difference between the two works. See supra note 68. The originality may stem from changes to
the composition or the inherent structure of the primary work, as when a novel is repurposed for
the big screen, to the expression (a translation), or both. See Ochoa, supra note 76, at 1006-07
(discussing the Galoob case: 'The Game Genie does not contain or produce a separate copy (a
material object) of the copyrighted work, which could then be transferred; but whether the
altered screen displays are a separate work (an intangible intellectual creation) is the question to
be decided.").
82. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). The Copyright Act states:
The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting
material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the
preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not
affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright
protection in the preexisting material.
Id.; see also infra note 83 and accompanying text.
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particular use is infringing.83 The distinction between derivation and
(other forms of) reproduction is that a nonderivative form of copying
takes the expression of the primary work, while a derivation may take
but it must also transfer and transform what makes the primary work
original.84
The distinction matters.85 It matters more than might appear
at first glance because derivation is not reproduction plus
transformation. In a number of cases, what is taken to create the
derivative work must be considered differently than under a generic
reproduction analysis. Put differently, operationally the two inquiries
are often distinct; normatively, they almost always are.8 6  The
qualitative part of the reproduction inquiry focuses chiefly on the form
of what was taken while the derivation inquiry looks at a deeper level
of appropriation, namely at whether the creative choices that made the
primary work worthy of copyright protection were taken.87 This is the
key to understanding the difference. It explains why the form (e.g.,
two- versus three-dimensional and novel versus film) and mode of
expression (e.g., language) of a derivative work (see the list of named
derivatives in § 101) are almost always different. Yet, while the form
is different and separates a derivative use from a correctly cabined
83. Hence, by contrast, if one copies unoriginal elements, no infringement has taken
place. See Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 41-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The court had to decide
whether Roots, the famous novel written by Alex Haley, copied the novel Jubilee, written by the
plaintiff. Id. at 42. The court noted that the similarity was essentially that both works were
"amalgams of fact and fiction derived from the sombre history of black slavery in the United
States. Each purports to be at least loosely based on the lives of the author's own forbears." Id.
This was (rightly) found insufficient to constitute copyright infringement. Id. at 46.
84. Naturally, the author of a derivative work is able to exercise her rights only in
respect of her additions or changes to the primary work. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). Also, under US law, infringement occurs when the expression of
another work is taken (that is, not the ideas), which means that expression would have to be
taken here as well. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. However, as noted above, this
large overlap between the reproduction and expression may stem precisely from a lack of
precision in the definition of derivation in US law. See supra notes 6, 65 and accompanying text.
85. See STERLING, supra note 61, § 9.04 ("It could be said that all adaptations involve
reproduction, where the essential features of the adapted work are used. However, in many laws
(and under the Berne Convention) the right of adaptation is viewed separately from that of
reproduction.").
86. As commentators have noted in a discussion of modern French law, but in a remark
that can be generalized, "[d]ifficulties arise when courts have to determine at what point
sufficient originality in changing the underlying work warrants protection of any resulting
derivative work." Andre Lucas et al., France, in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW & PRACTICE,
at FRA-29 (Paul E. Geller ed., 2011).
87. The creative choices are those that one can isolate by asking whether two authors in
similar situations (tools, direction, budget, etc.) would likely have created the same product. See
Gervais, supra note 81, at 965 n.98; see also Judge & Gervais, supra note 70, at 376-77. The
Author posits that what might be called the "quantitative part" of the analysis is the
determination of the substantiality of the taking.
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reproduction inquiry, the main point is that the derivative user takes
the creative choices that made the primary work original.88 For
example, when a computer program is transferred to another
programming language, not a single word is copied. Hence, is the
matter not better understood as a form of derivation?89 This Article
shows that other major systems that have tried to distinguish those
uses for many decades have reached similar conclusions, which are
also compatible with major international copyright treaties.90
As a corollary to the third principle, the purpose of the use is a
strong indication of whether a use derives or copies without
derivation. Derivation is a use designed to create and express
something new or in a different format. In this sense, derivation and
nonderivative copying both use the primary work. Derivation,
however, typically uses the work at a higher level of abstraction in
order to blend new choices and embed them in the primary work.91
B. Cautionary Principles
(4) Because derivative works are often named forms of
transformation, any extension of the right beyond those must be done
carefully. Named derivatives (internationally and in most national
copyright statutes) usually pose little analytical difficulty. 92  The
problems arise in the category of "penumbral derivatives," which
includes unnamed transformations of a primary work. Courts should
take care not to expand that category to new forms of reuse without a
clear reason to do so. Otherwise, the category might expand beyond
reasonable measure and catch reuses vaguely "based upon" a previous
(primary) work in a colloquial sense, but without a solid normative
88. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) ("These
choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are made independently by the compiler
and entail a minimal degree of creativity, are sufficiently original that Congress may protect
such compilations through the copyright laws."); Gervais, supra note 81, at 975-81 (suggesting a
definition of "creative choice" that would meet copyright law principles).
89. More specifically, the matter is better understood as a form of derivation because
the structure of the two languages is likely to be very different. The Author suggests this is the
case when any language is translated into a language with a completely different structure
(English to, say, Mandarin Chinese).
90. See infra Parts III-IV.
91. Consumptive use or use for another purpose (information, education, or
entertainment) is typically a copy, not a derivation, and its infringing nature will depend on the
presence of a defense (such as fair use) or license. Purpose, like market impact discussed below,
is best seen as indicia, not a tool that directly delineates the derivative right.
92. Including, according to the US statute, "translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation, or any other .... [WJork consisting of editorial revisions, annotations,
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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grounding. Think of digital technology and the Internet, which allow
for both creation and distribution of works, including mash-ups,
sampling-based recordings, and fan sites.93 All of these are based upon
preexisting content in a colloquial sense, but are they-or more
precisely should they be-considered to infringe rights in such
preexisting content from a normative perspective? If so, what are the
metes and bounds of the exclusive right? This principle urges caution
in the extension of the right to prohibit those new uses.
(5) Key limiting doctrines apply differently to derivative uses
because those uses are also creative. A better understanding of the
derivative right would lead to a better understanding of its inherent
limits and of external doctrines such as fair use. Internationally, the
idea-expression dichotomy and its US cousin, the scenes 6, faire
doctrine, are other good candidates for a differential application to
derivative uses (as opposed to pure copies), bearing in mind that many
derivative uses are themselves creative.94
Beyond the strict confines of the scones e faire doctrine, courts
may need to consider certain factors. For instance, courts might
consider whether the derivative user had access to a limited stock of
building blocks, as is the case for pop music, for example; whether the
tools used, including standard UGC software, imposed constraints or
maybe even suggested certain choices; and whether the laws of the
genre might have dictated a course of action.95 Otherwise, copyright
"morphs into a terribly crude test of first-in-time, first-in-right." 96
Limiting doctrines will likely evolve as they are called upon to
accomplish much work in the context of new forms of derivation,
especially in providing the necessary modulation to protect free
93. Under US law, this normative guidance must be reconciled with the statutory
language, which covers tangible media of expression "now known or later developed." Id.
§ 102(a). The Author's point is not to exclude any medium but to suggest caution when
expanding rights to new uses of technologies from which new cultural forms and practices may
emerge.
94. See Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright: The Scenes & Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. L. REV. 79,
112-14 (1989).
95. See Wellett Potter & Heather A Forrest, Musicological and Legal Perspectives on
Music Borrowing: Past, Present and Future, 22 AUSTRALIAN INTELL. PROP. J. 137, 143-44 (2011).
96. Id. at 155. The notion of originality as requiring creative (intellectual) choices seems
to preclude predicating copyright on mere uniqueness or "novelty." As the eminent German
scholar Eugen Ulmer notes:
[S]tatistical uniqueness, is rapidly achieved. It can result from the mere fact that a
pen has squirted abundant quantities of ink, thus producing arbitrarily distributed
blots, or that footprints have been left in some way on a support capable of preserving
the marks, even though not the slightest requirements have been fulfilled as far as
intellectual effort is concerned.
Eugen Ulmer, The Copyright Concept of Intellectual Works in Modern Art, 5 COPYRIGHT 80, 81
(1969).
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expression. But limits may also come from a proper application of
infringement doctrines, particularly in refusing injunctions when the
public interest commands otherwise. That said, the issue of
potentially excessive statutory damages remains relevant.97
(6) Courts should tread with caution when considering new
forms of creation, from UGC to contemporary art forms based on
appropriation, both for First Amendment and cultural reasons.9 8 Part
V devotes specific attention to appropriation art to explicate those
difficulties. The analysis can be ported to more modern forms of
creation such as UGC.99
This Article will now attempt to demonstrate the correctness of
these six principles, and propose a test to implement them.
III. THE RIGHT TO MAKE DERIVATIVE WORKS FROM AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE
This Part begins with the 1886 Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention).100 The
Berne Convention is the most comprehensive copyright treaty both in
scope and geographic coverage.10 1 In 1994, it was largely incorporated
into the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS Agreement).102
A look at the evolution of the derivative right in pre-Berne
Europe, the cradle of the Berne Convention, yields useful and
97. See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 441 (2009) ("Awards of statutory
damages are frequently arbitrary, inconsistent, unprincipled, and sometimes grossly excessive.").
98. See infra Part V.C.
99. See infra Part V.C.
100. Berne Convention, supra note 14. The Berne Convention was originally signed in
1886, following three diplomatic conferences held in Berne, Switzerland, in 1884, 1885, and
1886. A Protocol was added to the Convention at the time of its adoption in 1886, and the
Convention itself was later revised six times, in 1896, 1908, 1928, 1948, 1967, and 1971. See
generally WIPO, BERNE CONVENTION CENTENARY 1886-1986 (1986) [hereinafter BERNE
CONVENTION CENTENARY] (discussing the history of the Convention and providing a summary of
the discussions as well as the role of each participating country).
101. As of February 9, 2013, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) had
166 member states. See WIPO, Contracting Parties, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Show
Results.jsp?lang--en&treatyid=15 (last visited Feb. 9, 2013). By comparison, the World Trade
Organization, which administers the TRIPS Agreement, had 158 Members. See WTO, Members
and Observers, www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited Feb. 9,
2013). And the Universal Copyright Convention had 65 member states party to it. See Universal
Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 194.
102. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 47, art. 9(1); Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, in THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999).
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interesting clues.103 Early copyright literature emphasized two types
of derivation, namely adaptations and translations, both of which are
mentioned in the definition of derivative work in the current US
statute.10 4 Other adaptations pose greater analytical difficulties.10 5
A. The Emergence of the Derivative Right Internationally
This Part explores the laws of the nineteenth-century Western
European nations that negotiated the Berne Convention to discover
clues concerning the beginnings of the derivative right. This first
section wishes to paint the broad normative outline of the emergence
of the derivative right. Part 1II.B explains exactly how it emerged and
evolved in the text of the Berne Convention.
Early in the twentieth century, European nations did not
generally recognize a derivative right.106 In fact, many key countries
failed to recognize even a basic right of translation.107 For example, as
of 1903, Russia had limited the translation right to "scientific works,"
and that right was valid for only two years.108  Denmark only
prohibited translation in a Nordic language.109 More importantly, in
103. Countries attending the 1886 conference where the Convention was signed were
Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Haiti, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Spain, Switzerland,
Tunisia, and the United States (which only sent a diplomat from the Embassy in Berne to
observe, as the United States did not sign the text). See BERNE CONVENTION CENTENARY, supra
note 100, at 28, 130. Another strong indicator is the location of the successive revision
conferences, that is, after the original conference held in Berne, Switzerland: Paris (1896), Berlin
(1908), Rome (1928), Brussels (1948), Stockholm (1967), and Paris (1971), all cities in Western
Europe. See id. at 19-24.
104. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (mentioning translations and works that are "recast,
transformed, or adapted").
105. Translation (from one language to another) seems mostly self-explanatory, other
than for computer programs for which a debate still exists on the "translation" of
human-readable source code to executable object code:
While copyright protection is well established for both the source and object code
forms of a computer program, the theoretical basis upon which copyright is extended
to the object code form of a computer program and the relationship between the source
and the object code forms of a computer program have not been clearly articulated. At
first glance, the object code version of a computer program appears to be a derivative
work of the corresponding source code version of that computer program since
compilation appears to translate human comprehensible source code into machine
executable object code. The definition of "derivative work" in 17 U.S.C. § 101
reinforces this impression since it includes translations as one of the listed examples
of derivative works. Therefore, intuitively, the characterizing object code programs as
derivative works of source code programs has great appeal.
Michael F. Morgan. The Cathedral and the Bizarre: An Examination of the "Viral" Aspects of the
GPL, 27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 349, 408-09 (2010).
106. See infra notes 107-119 and accompanying text.
107. See GUSTAVE HUARD, 1 TRAITt DE LA PROPRItTt INTELLECTUELLE 74 (1903).
108. See id.
109. See id.
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several countries the existence of the right depended on the author
making a translation available within a specified timeframe-often
only two to three years from the publication of the original version.110
The underlying concerns were clear: access to foreign language works
was primordial and trumped copyright.'11 Those concerns would be
reflected in the 1896 text of the Berne Convention, which included a
translation right-provided, however, that an authorized translation
was made available within ten years.112 This amendment to the
original (1886) text of the Berne Convention was adopted as a
compromise.113
France, a major world power and exporter of books at the time,
was one of the few countries to insist on a full translation right.114
France had been one of the first European countries to introduce a full
translation right in its domestic copyright legislation.115  This
domestic example served as the basis for bilateral treaties entered into
by the French.n6 Interestingly, under French law, infringement
depended on the existence of monetary damage to the author.117
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
113. HUARD, supra note 107, at 275.
114. ETIENNE BRICON, DES DROITS D'AUTEUR DANS LES RAPPORTS INTERNATIONAUX 87
(1888).
115. An 1852 decree by Louis-Napol6on protected the translation right "at the same level
as the right of reproduction." Decree-Law of Mar. 28, 1852, Literary and Artistic Property Rights
in Foreign Published Works, reprinted in CH. LYON-CAEN & PAUL DELALAIN. I LOIS FRANCAISES
ET ETRANGERES SUR LA PROPRIETE LITTERAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE 35 (1889). Prince Louis-Napol6on
made a statement that might rejoice Lockean theorists: "Intellectual works are property like
land and houses." Letter from Louis-Napol6on to Mr. Jobard (1844), in BRICON, supra note 114,
at 48-49 (Author's translation). As it happens, Jobard was an advocate for strong authors' rights
and "lobbied" for perpetual rights, a thesis which the Berne Conferences rejected. See EDOUARD
ROMBERG, COMPTE-RENDU DES TRAVAUX DU CONGRES DE LA PROPRIETE LITTERAIRE ET
ARTISTIQUE 275 (1859). This was also the interpretation by French courts. See id.
116. This is not unlike current US practice in bilateral trade treaties:
Since the early 2000s, the European Union and the United States have pushed
aggressively for the development of bilateral and regional trade agreements. Termed
economic partnership agreements ("EPAs") by the European Union and free trade
agreements ("FTAs") by the United States, these instruments seek to transplant laws
from the more powerful signatories to the less powerful ones.
Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 953, 955 (2011).
117. See HUARD, supra note 107, at 175. How far the United States has moved from this
state of affairs! This is so, especially under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
§ 512 (2006), which made circumvention of technical protection measures illegal even if there is
no underlying infringement of the copyright in the work protected by such measure. See, e.g.,
MDY Indus., LLC. v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 945 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that
traditional copyright infringement was not required but reading the statute broadly to extend
protection to "the right to prevent circumvention of access controls"), amended and superseded on
denial of reh'g, No. 09-15932, 2011 WL 538748 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2011). Contra Chamberlain
Grp. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1197 (2004).
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French courts considered that differences between a new, allegedly
infringing work and a preexisting one were irrelevant; they focused
instead on how much and what parts of the preexisting work had been
appropriated.1 1 8  The inquiry proceeded as follows: first, were
elements that gave the primary work its "originality" taken, and
second, did this appropriation cause a (financial) prejudice to the
author?119  Under this two-prong test, abridgements, musical
arrangements, and translations were generally prohibited because,
first, the author would lose the benefit of being able to license such
uses, and second, those uses took the "pith and marrow" of the
primary work.120
Access to foreign-language works was a clear concern for
several of the other Berne countries.121  Arguing in favor of
subordinating the existence of the right of translation to the
publication of an authorized translation (access, in modern parlance)
within a certain period of time, the organizers of the 1859 Congress of
the Association Litt6raire et Artistique Internationale (ALAI) wrote:
The starting point of the literary property right is the publication of a work. Society
guarantees authors certain advantages in exchange for those he himself provides. Yet
the translation privilege, when the author fails to use it, is an effect without a cause. It
is not fair that society shall be forever deprived, by his negligence or omission, an
enjoyment on which it could count, and that people other than the author are prepared
to provide.12 2
A broader right of adaptation (beyond translation) did not get the
same level of even partial support because it clashed with the practice
118. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936) ("[N]o
plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate."). For
French law on this point, see HUARD, supra note 107, at 175.
119. See HUARD, supra note 107, at 175-76.
120. Id. at 176-79.
121. The "Acts" of Congresses of the Association Litt6raire et Artistique Internationale
(ALAI) that took place before 1884 shed additional light on the matter. The first Diplomatic
Conference to negotiate the Berne Convention was held in 1884. ALAI had submitted a draft,
which the Swiss government modified and submitted as a draft treaty. ALAI was a key player on
several levels, having produced the initial draft of the Berne Convention. See STEPHEN P. LADAS,
1 THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 71-88 (1938); 6 REV.
INT'L DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 144, 144-45 (1955). ALAI continued to take part (as what in modern
parlance would be called a nongovernmental organization) in the discussions, however. ALAI
was founded in 1878 by French playwright and public intellectual Victor Hugo, its first
President. ALAI Congresses were held (during the relevant period) in 1879 (London); 1880
(Lisbon); 1881 (Vienna); 1882 (Rome); 1883 (Amsterdam), and 1884 (Brussels). See ACTES DU
CONGRtS DE DRESDE 11 (1895). ALAI had argued in favor of a full reproduction right and an
adaptation right (at least the production of a dramatic version of a nondramatic work, starting in
starting in 1887 (Madrid) and essentially at every ALAI Congress after that. See id. at 7-8.
122. EDOUARD ROMBERG, COMPTE-RENDU DES TRAVAUX DU CONGRES DE LA PROPRIETE
LITTERAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE 11 (1859). The Author's translation retained the gendered references
in the original text.
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of many Berne members.123 The adaptation of three-dimensional
works of art in two-dimensional formats or vice versa (industrial
design) was a major concern for Austria, Finland, Germany, Japan,
and Mexico.124
Matters were not wholly different in the United Kingdom. The
British International Copyright Act protected translations.12 5 But
Britain allowed other adaptations of non-British works. 126  For
example, in Wood v. Chart, the court found that the translation of the
French play Frou-Frou was in fact a permissible "imitation or
adaptation" to the English stage and not a translation, quoting the
language of the statute at the time.127 The apparent distinction was
that a translation would afford "the English people . . . the opportunity
of knowing the French work as accurately as possible."128 By contrast,
the defendant's version transferred some scenes from France to
England, made the characters English and introduced English
manners, which the court was prompt to note "differ from French
manners."129
In discussing musical arrangements, Copinger makes a similar
point, in a way that seems to prefigure the "lay hearer" test of more
recent US cases. Copinger states:
Now, the most unlettered in music can distinguish one song from another, and the mere
adaptation of the air, either by changing it to a dance or by transferring it from one
instrument to another, does not, even to common apprehensions, alter the original
subject. The ear tells you that it is the same. The original air requires the aid of genius
for its construction, but a mere mechanic in music can make the adaptation or
accompaniment.130
123. See HUARD, supra note 107, at 74.
124. See id.
125. See International Copyright Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict., c. 12 (Eng.).
126. Id. A number of European playwrights chose not to publish their plays and only
allowed their public performance to avoid having their plays adapted without heir authorization
in the United States. See BRICON, supra note 114, at 34-36. This concern about access is still
reflected today in the Appendix to the Convention, which allows developing countries to grant
compulsory translation licenses for works not made available in a national language.
127. See WALTER ARTHUR COPINGER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT IN WORKS OF LITERATURE
AND ART 481 (1893).
128. Id.
129. Id. Interestingly, in the index to the book, under the entry "Adaptation," it says "see
Imitations." Id. at exix.
130. Id. at 160. Copinger may be referring to D'Almaine v Boosey, (1835) 160 Eng. Rep.
117 (H.L.), a House of Lords decision holding the defendant's musical arrangement an
infringement of the underlying musical work because the arrangement lacked original
authorship. The court implied that an adaptation could not be original and infringing. See id.
The Author is grateful to Jane Ginsburg for this insight. On the lay hearer test, see Michael Der
Manuelian, Note, The Role of the Expert Witness in Music Copyright Infringement Cases, 57
FORDHAM L. REV. 127, 144-45 (1988).
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Commentators emphasized the nature of the adaptor's work to
support the freedom to adapt foreign works.131 They referred to the
"great talents, ingenuity, and judgment" of authors of notes or
additions to existing works not just as permissible but worthy of their
own copyright.132 This is part of the key distinction between copying
and derivation.
European countries worked hard to try to define the exact
scope of uses protected by copyright. Switzerland, as the host of the
three conferences that led to the adoption of the Berne Convention,
had a key role to play in the negotiations. In the course of the early
discussions leading up to the Berne negotiations, the (future) Swiss
delegate at the Berne Convention preparatory conferences, Louis
Ulbach, provided a definition of the term "adaptation": "[An
adaptation] is the transformation1 33 by striking off, changes to the
text, or by developments that the original author had not foreseen,
with the sole purpose of appropriating the work without giving the
impression of translating or infringing it."134 As discussed below, the
1886 Berne Conference would in fact assimilate adaptations to
"disguised" reproductions.13 5 Those early texts distinguished a specific
form of derivation (translation) and hesitated to grant a right beyond
translation with respect to other forms of transformations or
adaptations. 136
The following years would see other derivatives emerge,
leading to an early international notion of derivative work that
included translations and specific conversions or transformations of a
primary work, which encompassed transformations from one format or
genre to another (e.g., novel to film or play; film to novel or play, etc.)
and musical arrangements.1 37 Beyond that, the penumbral category
(unnamed derivatives) was present (other "appropriations by
alteration") but remained very diffuse. It rested on a concept of
"disguised reproduction."138  The notion of derivative work then
continued to evolve, most notably in the 1948 text of the Berne
131. RICHARD GODSON, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS
AND OF COPYRIGHT 242 (1832). Godson, a member of the British Parliament, cites a case where a
new edition of Milton's Paradise Lost (which was in the public domain) could not be reprinted
without authorization because it contained additional notes still protected by copyright. See id.
at 244; see also Tonson v. Walker, (1739) 96 Eng. Rep. 184.
132. See GODSON, supra note 131, at 242.
133. The French term is "travestissement," which has a clear pejorative connotation.
Literally, it means the "cross-dressing" of a work.
134. See BRICON, supra note 114, at 86-87 (emphasis added).
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Convention, to include noncopying "alterations," that is, infringement
by derivations not involving (only) a reproduction.139
One can see that, at the international level, the right against
the making of unauthorized derivatives was conceptually distinct from
the right of reproduction.140  The cradle of the early notion of
derivation was the suggestion that what constitutes an infringing
appropriationl41 is the taking of those elements that gave the infringed
work its originality and transforming or recasting them.142  The
approach was consistent: a work was protected under that proposal if
it was original, if it was infringed, and if what the defendant took was
what made it original in the first place.143 In more modern parlance,
this analysis aligns the test to grant protection (originality) and the
infringement analysis (how much or what elements of the plaintiffs
work were taken).144 This is also precisely what courts tend to do, and
it demonstrates the correctness of filtering out elements that cannot
be protected.145  The approach allows one to make appropriate
distinctions about the "copyright value" of what was taken, on the one
hand, and what was produced, on the other.
B. The Derivative Right in the Berne Convention
The original (1886) text of the Berne Convention established a
distinction between translations and other forms of adaptation. It
stated, first, that "lawful translations shall be protected as original
works," adding that "in the case of a work for which the translating
139. See BERNE CONVENTION CENTENARY, supra note 100, at 231.
140. See id.
141. The Author hesitates to use "misappropriation" because that term has its own
significance, although the overlap between the illicit appropriation in the Berne travaux and the
common-law notion of misappropriation is significant. For a discussion on the issue in the United
States, where it tends to revolve around federal preemption, see Lauren M. Gregory, Note, Hot
Off the Presses: How Traditional Newspaper Journalism Can Help Reinvent the "Hot News"
Misappropriation Tort in the Internet Age, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 577 (2011). Gregory,
discussing NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997), noted:
[T]he "extra element" test [from NBA] it produced is useful in defining the boundaries
of hot news misappropriation . . . . [Tihe court was trying to demonstrate that
misappropriation is distinct enough from copyright infringement to stand on its own
legal footing. In other words, misappropriation-stealing from a competitor to get
ahead in business-is distinct from the generalized bad-faith taking that copyright
law prohibits, and is not, therefore, preempted by copyright law.
Id. at 596. The approach chosen here is reminiscent of the improper-appropriation test applied in
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
142. And similar to the approach taken by a number of US courts. See infra Part III.B.
143. See BERNE CONVENTION CENTENARY, supra note 100, at 231.
144. See Gervais, supra note 81, at 978-81.
145. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707 (2d Cir. 1992);
see also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 60, § 13.03[A].
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right has fallen into the public domain, the translator cannot oppose
the translation of the same work by other writers."46 Then, Article 10
included "among the unlawful reproductions to which this Convention
applies," the following: "unauthorized indirect appropriations of a
literary or artistic work, of various kinds, such as adaptations, musical
arrangements, etc."14 7 As suggested in the New Guide, the notion of
derivative work was subsumed under that of reproduction in the 1886
text.148 This seems to have been based on the perception that both
reproductions and adaptation were comparable misappropriations of
the preexisting work by the author of the copy and of the derivative
work.149
The 1896 Additional Act and Interpretative Protocol to the
Conventioniso added an exclusive right of translation for authors
"throughout the term of their right in the original work."151 It had an
important caveat, however: that right ceased to exist if the author had
not "availed himself of it during a term of ten years from the date of
first publication of the primary work, by publishing or causing to be
published, in one of the countries of the Union, a translation in the
language for which protection is claimed."152
Twelve years later at the 1908 Berlin Revision Conference, the
Berne Convention maintained the prohibition against "unauthorized
indirect appropriations"1 5 3 but made clear that it intended to cover
only adaptations or translations by reproduction.1 5 4 There was thus
no distinct derivative right in the Berne Convention at the time.
While the 1908 Berlin Act made it clear that a translation had to be
authorized, it also deleted the 1886 mention that only lawful
translations were themselves protected works.155 Beyond that, there
was simply no agreement on the normative limits of the right. While
some countries pushed for a broad right, a commentator noted that
146. Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 6; see BERNE CONVENTION CENTENARY, supra
note 100, at 228. For dramatic works, the right extended to public performances of the translated
work. See Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 9(2).
147. BERNE CONVENTION CENTENARY, supra note 100, at 228.
148. See MIHALY FICSOR, GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS TREATIES
ADMINISTERED BY WIPO AND GLOSSARY OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS TERMS 81 (2003)
[hereinafter NEW GUIDE].
149. See id.
150. Id. at 228.
151. Id.
152. Id. The ten-year rule is still available under the most recent (1971) Act of the
Convention but is subject to a declaration. See Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 30(2)(b).
153. ANDRE PETIT, ETUDE SUR LA CONVENTION DE BERLIN DE 1908 POUR LA PROTECTION
DES (EUVRES LITTERAIRES ET ARTISTIQUES 28-29 ((EUVRES LITTERAIRES ETARTISTIQUES 1911).
154. See CLAUDE MASOUYE, GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION 76 (1978) [hereinafter
GUIDE] (emphasis added).
155. BERNE CONVENTION CENTENARY, supra note 100, at 150-52.
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letting a translator enforce her rights on an unauthorized translation
"pushed a little too far" the notion of authors' rights.156 A clear
concern, as international trade in books was growing, was access to
foreign works. 15 7
Reading Articles 2 and 12 of the Berlin Act (1908) in tandem, it
becomes clear that the notion of derivation in the Berne Convention
was understood at the time as follows: First, adaptations could
constitute original works.58 Indeed, in later revisions of the Berne
Convention it was said that adaptations must be original in their own
right to be considered derivative works at all. 15 9  Second, the
adaptation right was still viewed as a subset of the right of
reproduction.1 60 Article 12 defined an infringing adaptation as a
reproduction in the same form with nonessential changes, additions,
or deletions, which was not in itself an original work.161 This implied
that using a preexisting work to create a new, original one would not
infringe, a view that some courts, notably in Germany, had
endorsed.162  Interestingly, this formulation may be viewed as a
precursor of the US notion of transformativeness in fair use
jurisprudence and of the equivalent French notion.163 Indeed, there is
an explicit reference in the Berlin (1908) text to "transformed"
reproductions.16 4 A French commentator mentions as examples of
acceptable adaptations parodies and transformations of a serious work
156. PETIT, supra note 153, at 27.
157. See NEW GUIDE, supra note 148, at 53 ("The right of translation was the first right
to be recognized under the Convention, which is quite understandable since the use of works of
other countries in translations was the most obvious issue in international relations."). A basic
ten-year right was present in the original 1886 text. See GUIDE, supra note 154. It was expanded
significantly in 1896. See NEW GUIDE, supra note 148, at 53.
158. There were a number of anomalies in the drafting, however. The meaning is clearer
now, but only in hindsight. See 1 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 480-81 (2d ed. 2006).
159. See id. at 483 ("'Alteration' for the purposes of article 2(3) must imply something
further, a change, modification, or transformation of the original; work resulting in something
which can fairly be regarded as a distinct intellectual creation.").
160. Id. at 481-82.
161. Id. at 650 (emphasis added).
162. See NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 59 (2008).
163. The French Intellectual Property Code states that "The authors of translations,
adaptations, transformations or arrangements of works of the mind shall enjoy the protection
afforded by this Code, without prejudice to the rights of the author of the original work. The
same shall apply to the authors of anthologies or collections of miscellaneous works or data, such
as databases, which, by reason of the selection or the arrangement of their contents, constitute
intellectual creations." CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE, Art. L.112-13 (Fr.) (emphasis
added). The French Civil Supreme Court (Cour de cassation) found that the proper limit of the
right of the adapted or transformed work was reached when the transformation of the intrinsic
form of that work is so deep that the original form was no longer present. See Cour de cassation
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] ire civ., D. 1992, 182, note Gautier (Fr.).
164. See BERNE CONVENTION CENTENARY, supra note 100, at 229.
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in the form of comedies such as operettas and operas-bouffe, provided
that the adaptation resulted from a personal contribution that had
given a "new spirit" to the work.165
But matters evolved beyond this initial approach. The changes
made to the Berne Convention at the Brussels Revision Conference in
1948166 reflected the belief that limiting infringement adaptation to
reproductions (or subsuming the former under the latter) was
incorrect or too narrow an approach: "[T]here are other ways of
exploiting works. It became common ground that, in general, the
author enjoyed the Convention's right not only for his work in its
original form but also for all transformations of it."167
The new provision refrained "from laying down what
constitutes adaptation, but it is agreed that this includes any new
form of the substance of the work, marginal cases being left to the
courts."16 8 By 1948, the Berne Convention was thus drawing closer to
infringement beyond reproduction by the taking of the "originality"
(substance) of the work.169 In fact, the 1948 Brussels Act of the Berne
Convention formally divorced derivative works from the existence of a
reproduction. 170 The Berne drafters envisaged a broad commercial
exploitation right for protected works.171 The Brussels Act reflected a
determined attempt to broaden the scope of protection but not by
viewing all derivative works as reproductions of protected works.172
This notion of protected commercial exploitation also meshes
well with the main exception test contained both in the Berne
Convention and the TRIPS Agreement.17 3 This is known as the
three-step test, the second step of which prohibits exceptions that
165. The Author points to Wikipedia, which got it right on this point. An opdra-bouffe is a
"genre of late 19th century French operetta, closely associated with Jacques Offenbach, who
produced many of them at the Thdtre des Bouffes-Parisiens that gave its name to the form."
Opdra Bouffe, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org (search "Op6ra bouffe") (last visited Dec. 15,
2011). The long-standing conceptual confusion underlying the conclusion that if the adaptation
displays original authorship it could not also be infringing was surmounted by thel948 Berne
text. See PETIT, supra note 153, at 29.
166. See BERNE CONVENTION CENTENARY, supra note 100, at 231-32.
167. GUIDE, supra note 154, at 76 (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 77 (emphasis added).
169. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
170. See BERNE CONVENTION CENTENARY, supra note 100, at 180-81, 231.
171. See SILKE VON LEWINSKI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND POLICY 142-43
(2008) ("[A]daptation was conceived in the early versions of the Berne Convention as a specific
kind of reproduction . . . . It was only at the 1948 Brussels Conference that the adaptation right
was formulated as a self-standing, independent exclusive right. . .
172. Id.
173. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 47.
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interfere with normal commercial exploitation of the work.174 If one
were to reconcile the right and the exception, the question could be
framed as follows: when is (enough of) the substance of a work taken
that it affects the market for the primary work?1 5 In the case of a
translation and presumably of true musical arrangements the answer
may not be too hard to find, but the line may be harder to draw with
respect to mash-ups and other forms of remix and reuse.176
C. Derivative Works in the Current Text of the Berne Convention
The current text (1971) of the Berne Convention, to which the
Unites States became party in 1989, contains a number of provisions
that are relevant to the analysis. The first worth mentioning is
Article 2(3), which reads as follows: "Translations, adaptations,
arrangements of music and other alterations of a literary or artistic
work shall be protected as original works without prejudice to the
copyright in the original work."177 The original World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) Guide to the Berne Convention noted in
connection with this provision that "[t]his paragraph deals with what
are often called derivative works, i.e., those based on another,
pre-existing, work."178 The Guide explained that there are four types
of derivative works.179 First, translations "express another's thoughts
in a different language."180 Second, adaptations are generally works
in their own right and consist of adapting a work in a different format,
for example a novel finding its way onto a stage or screen.181 An
adaptation may, of course, also be a translation.182 The third type is
musical arrangements; the fourth, "generally all other alterations of
literary and artistic works."18 3  The first three are the named
derivatives previously identified. The last covers penumbral
174. See Daniel J. Gervais, Towards a New Core International Copyright Norm: The
Reverse Three-Step Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 16-19 (2005).
175. This goes back to the ratio issue and the quotation right. An interesting remark was
made by the Rapporteur of the Brussels Revision Conference: "The question of borrowings from
known works has always been a source of abuses; moreover it is very difficult to bridle the right
of quotation which, without actually affording evidence of culture, remains a habit of writers."
BERNE CONVENTION CENTENARY, supra note 100, at 180.
176. See infra Part V.B.
177. Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 2(3) (emphasis added).








derivatives.184  No express criteria are provided in the Berne
Convention to determine where the line should be drawn between the
creation of a derivative work and simple "inspiration" that would not
require an authorization. But commentators have argued that the
normative footing for the entire category is identical because the
"skills necessary for adaptation and arrangement could be compared
to those necessary for translation."18 5
Other substantive provisions worth mentioning in this
context-compilations, translations, and adaptations-are structured
along the same lines.186 The Berne Convention contains, first, a right
of translation and a number of rights related thereto.187 Second, the
Berne Convention provides for a right of adaptation defined as the
right of authorizing "adaptations, arrangements and other alterations
of [authors'] works."188 This suggests that the notion of derivative
works in the Berne Convention is an umbrella notion that
encompasses translations, adaptations (including changes of "format"),
musical arrangements, and other alterations, but is also distinct from
reproduction. 189
The new WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention, published in
2003, explains that the right of adaptation "may find its origin in the
right of reproduction."190 This is because an adaptation means "the
combination of the pre-existing elements of the works concerned-the
use of which in the adaptation, etc., may well be regarded as
reproduction of those elements-with some new ones, as a result of
which normally a new work emerges."191 The New Guide suggests,
however, that Article 12, the main provision on the right of adaptation
in the Berne Convention added in 1948, was meant to limit confusion
"in respect of those cases where adaptations, etc., amounted to the
creation of new derivative works."192
From this analysis, one can posit that there is a difference
between derivation as defined in Berne and reproduction. While both
184. Id.
185. See 1 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 158, at 476.
186. See Berne Convention, supra note 14, arts. 2(3), 2(5), 8, 12.
187. Id. arts. 8, 11bis(2), 11ter(2). The former provides authors of dramatic and
dramatic-musical works "the same rights with respect to translations thereof." As the Guide to
the Berne Convention explains, Article 8 applies if a libretto is translated, but if that translated
libretto is publicly performed, then Article 1lbis(2) applies. See GUIDE, supra note 154, at 65.
Article 11ter(2) provides for a right to "recite" translations of literary works. Public recitation
would be considered a public performance under US law. Id.
188. See Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 12.
189. See NEW GUIDE, supra note 148, at 81.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 81-82.
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rights are normatively motivated by a desire to protect legitimate
market expectations, derivation is not a subset or de minimis adjunct
of reproduction, unlike, say, trademark dilution.193 It has its own
domain, which will become clearer as Part IV considers doctrines of
France and Germany, two countries that played a major role in the
evolution of the Berne Convention.
IV. THE DERIVATIVE RIGHT IN MAJOR EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS
Part IV now turns the analytical spotlight to three sovereign
states, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, all of which have a
long tradition and rich copyright doctrine, to look for useful insights
on what makes a new work a derivative of another.
A. France
French law dealing with the scope of the derivative right is
illuminating. There are, as seen below, many parallels with US law,
but also a number of differences.194 One obvious parallel is that
derivation comes under one of the two major rights umbrellas:
reproduction.1 9 5 Two important differences are that (a) fixation is not
required to obtain copyright protection, and (b) performances are
protected under a neighboring right.196
Another reason to consider French law is that French courts
and scholars have struggled with the notion of derivative works for
193. In Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002), Judge Posner seems to
consider free-riding a form of dilution:
[T]here is a possible concern with situations in which, though there is neither blurring
nor tarnishment, someone is still taking a free ride on the investment of the
trademark owner in the trademark.... This rationale for antidilution law has not yet
been articulated in or even implied by the case law, although a few cases suggest that
the concept of dilution is not exhausted by blurring and tarnishment . ... The validity
of the rationale may be doubted, however.
Ty Inc., 306 F.3d at 512. Free-riding is also one of the asserted foundations of the right. See Greg
Lastowka, Trademark's Daemons, 48 HouS. L. REV. 779, 813-14 (2011). The Author sees it more
as a normative driver than a tool to define the scope of the right.
194. See PAuL GOLDSTEIN & P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 316 (2d
ed. 2010).
195. Apart from the moral right, there are two umbrellas for economic copyright rights in
French law, a summa division between the right of reproduction, which includes adaptation,
translation, and similar alterations, and the right of "representation," which includes public
performance in front of a live audience or at a distance (known as communication to the public)
and other ways in which the work made available without copies being made. See ANDRE LUCAS
ET AL., TRAITE DE LA PROPRIETE LITTERAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE 247-48 (4th ed. 2012). In spite of this,
however, French scholars cabin reproduction qua reproduction and derivation. See infra notes
197-214 and accompanying text.
196. On the former point, see supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. On the latter,
see Gruenberger, supra note 21, at 627-28.
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decades and have suggested a number of useful distinctions. 19 Trying
to properly cabin reuses requiring an authorization from the owner of
the primary work, French commentators tried to distinguish works of
"absolute originality" from those that result from only "relative
originality."19 8 But they had to acknowledge that originality is rarely
"absolute" in the sense that works are always based upon the author's
experience and previous contacts with other works.199 It is difficult to
justify the granting of a right to prohibit the making of any work
"based upon" one or more preexisting works. The right must be
properly anchored both normatively and historically.200
Henri Desbois-probably still today the most cited copyright
scholar in France-offered several interesting hypotheses. First, he
suggested that authors of original works who borrow "protected
elements" from preexisting works were entitled to copyright
protection, though not if they infringe a primary work, a solution not
surprising to US readers.201 He then suggested a list of named
derivative works based on the French statute in existence at the time
(namely the 1957 Copyright Act): translations and literary
adaptations, transformations (which typically imply a transposition
from one genre to another, e.g., painting to sculpture), and musical
arrangements, including variations.202
In trying to define derivative works, Desbois suggested that
their originality stemmed from their composition, their literal
expression, or both. Derivation by adaptation usually incorporates
some of both, because even if the adaptor was following someone else,
he followed his imagination in adding elements of his own.2 0 3 By
contrast, a translator is enslaved to the primary work and is not
expected to add compositional elements. The originality is then
strictly based in the expression of the translator, not the
197. As already noted, the text of the French statute is similar in some respects to the
US Copyright Act, particularly in forcing courts to decide what is an infringing transformation.
Article L. 112-13 of the French Intellectual Property Code provides in part that:
The authors of translations, adaptations, transformations or arrangements of works of
the mind shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Code, without prejudice to the
rights of the author of the original work. The same shall apply to the authors of
anthologies or collections of miscellaneous works or data, such as databases, which, by
reason of the selection or the arrangement of their contents, constitute intellectual
creations.
CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE, Art. L.112-13 (Fr.) (emphasis added) (WIPOLex
translation).





203. See id. at 33.
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composition.204 The translator also makes creative choices, however,
in adapting the work to her own language and in selecting "more or
less adequate wording."205 Desbois saw the existence of originality in
the fact that two translators usually come up with very different
results if asked to translate the same text (unless it is very short or
highly technical).206 By contrast, the best example of a derivative
work that is original only by reason of its composition but not of its
expression would be an anthology, which may be original due to the
selection and arrangement of the contents.207 In both cases, however,
the message embedded in the primary work is not fundamentally
altered.
According to Desbois and the authors he relied on, including
Professors de Sanctis and Saporta, a visual artist who "disfigured" a
character described in a preexisting novel could be liable for a moral
right violation, but not for infringing the derivative right, because he
did not see that right as crossing from the figurative arts to the
literary ones.208 The explanation he gives is interesting. Desbois
quoted Saporta, among others, who justified his view by stating that
the economic exploitation of one genre had no impact on the
exploitation of other genres.209 Desbois agreed but only partially,
noting that a painting made from a novel might be analogized to a
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id. Surprisingly, Desbois was willing to give a copyright to someone copying a
work of art because of the skill involved by comparing the copyist effort to a translation,
although the two types of work seem wholly different. See id. at 75-76. Desbois seems to imply
that choosing to copy is a manifestation of personality. See id. This might inform an analysis of
some appropriation or forms of similar contemporary art. See infra Part V.
207. This notion closely mirrors Article 2(5) of the Berne Convention, which provides that
"[clollections of literary or artistic works such as encyclopaedias and anthologies which, by
reason of the selection and arrangement of their contents, constitute intellectual creations shall
be protected as such, without prejudice to the copyright in each of the works forming part of such
collections." Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 2(5). Article 10.2 of the TRIPS Agreement
provides, along similar lines, that "[clompilations of data or other material, whether in machine
readable or other form, which by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents
constitute intellectual creations shall be protected as such. Such protection, which shall not
extend to the data or material itself, shall be without prejudice to any copyright subsisting in the
data or material itself." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 47, art. 10(2). This is also similar to § 101
of the Copyright Act, which defines a "compilation" in part as a "work formed by the collection
and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in
such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2006). In US law, a work such as an anthology would be a collective work. See id.
208. See DESBOIS, supra note 198, at 106.
209. See id.; Marcel Saporta, A Few Notes on the Creation of "Personages", 11 REVUE INT.
DROIT D'AUTEUR 63 (1956). Saporta authored a book on the limits of copyright protection in
which he suggests that impact on economic exploitation should guide the policy-maker in




movie made from the same novel.210 Since the latter was a recognized
form of adaptation, there was no good normative reason to consider
the former any differently.211 The lesson from this is that there may
be a common normative intuition to what constitutes a derivative
work among the various categories of literary and artistic works, more
than in simply seeing a derivation as crossing the genre barrier.
Professor Andr6 Lucas, a very senior scholar in France and the
coauthor of the leading current treatise on French copyright law, has
suggested that what makes a work a derivative of another (as a
copyright matter) is the fact that it borrows the elements that
generated copyright protection in the primary work, which typically
would be by copying parts of it or its "general composition."212 Lucas
discusses Desbois's approach, which he describes as the composition
test.2 13 The test teaches that to decide whether an appropriation
crosses the derivative-right line, one must remember that copyright
does not protect the ideas or main incidents, but rather the particular
way the author develops the idea.214 He compares this test with
German jurist Jozef Kohler's distinction between the internal and
external form of a work.215 The latter seems to fall more properly
within the realm of reproduction and the former is better viewed
under derivation, especially if the purpose of copying the internal form
was to add to or transform it. This approach has theoretical appeal
but is admittedly easier to see in the case of, for example, a
compilation, than for other forms of artistic creation.216 The next
section returns to the German approach.
210. See DESBOIS, supra note 198, at 106-07.
211. See id. at 107.
212. See LUCAS ET AL., supra note 195, at 226-27.
213. See id. at 304-05.
214. See id. at 306-07. Lucas is careful about separating plagiarism from copyright
infringement, the former being a more general deontological analysis, the latter based on
copyright principles. See id. at 304-05. Copyright law focuses on the taking of what makes a
work original, while plagiarism focuses on unattributed takings, whether or not the work taken
from is protected by copyright:
Material whose copyright has expired, that has been created by the federal
government, that is not by nature copyrightable (such as an idea or fact), or that is
otherwise in the public domain, cannot be the subject of a copyright infringement
lawsuit, but its use without attribution could still ground an accusation of plagiarism.
Walter A. Effross, Owning Enlightenment: Proprietary Spirituality in the "New Age"
Marketplace, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 483, 551-52 (2003); see also Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms,
and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing
Intellectual Property Rights, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 200 (2002) ("Under the Federal Copyright
Act, there is no infringement when copying involves work that has an expired copyright [or] is in
the public domain . . .. The rule against plagiarism has no such limitations.").
215. See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
216. For a fuller discussion of Kohler's thesis, see infra text accompanying notes 229,
234. See also Philippe Gaudrat, Riflexions sur la Forme desOmuvres de L'Esprit, in MELANGES
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The matter is not only theoretical. The French supreme civil
court (Cour de cassation) has firmly adopted the "Desbois test" and
looks in harder infringement cases for whether the defendant has
taken what makes the plaintiffs work protectable in the first place.
Equating this with what can be misappropriated, the test is
counterbalanced by a broad application of the idea-expression
dichotomy.2 17 "Originality," Lucas tells us, "is the touchstone, the
essential condition for protection of a work; it is also the proper
measure of the scope of protection."2 18 He cites a number of key cases
including one in which the court found that the "appropriation
(reprise) without authorization of the original characteristic features
of the [primary] work" triggered the derivative right (more specifically
the right of adaptation).2 19
In providing examples of whether a work is a derivative subject
to the rights of the primary work, Desbois suggested that musical
arrangements should be compared to translations because the
arranger is trying to preserve the primary work's character.220 This
supports the principle of proximity (principle (3)) and the inverse
principle, namely that a fundamental change of character may well be
beyond the reach of the derivative right. As Part V discusses,
however, there is a hard line that divides fundamental changes that
are noninfringing under a proper derivative-right analysis (in most
cases because the idea, not the expression is appropriated), and those
that are noninfringing as transformative fair uses.221
Desbois makes interesting suggestions when trying to define
which musical arrangements are derivative works and which are mere
copies.222 He places in the latter category changes from one key to
EN L'HONNEUR DE ANDRE FRANQON 195, 201-03 (1995). This distinction may have been intended
to make the work of courts easier. See Brad Sherman, What Is a Copyright Work, 12
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 99, 114 (2011) ("Given the inherent difficulties in deciding what the
identifying traits of a work are, it is not surprising that the courts have fastened onto external
markers to help them decide whether something is a work.").
217. See LUCAS ET AL., supra note 195, at 305-06.
218. Id. at 308 (Author's abbreviated translation). Because this passage is difficult to
translate, the Author quotes the original text as well: "C'est la notion d'originalit6 qui, 1 encore,
constitue la pierre de touche. L'originalitk est la condition essentielle mise A la naissance du droit
de l'auteur. C'est elle qui donnera la mesure de la protection." Id. This analysis also seems
solidly anchored in French case law. See Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, June
27, 2001 (Fr.). The case may also be found at 2 REV. INT. DROIT D'AUTEUR 426 (2002).
219. See LUCAS ET AL., supra note 195, at 308; Tribunal de grande instance [TGI]
[ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Nanterre, Ire civ., March 10, 1993 (Fr.).
220. See DESBOIS, supra note 198, at 143. Desbois notes that a number of authors
referred to arrangements as "musical translations" and quotes Chartier that in an arrangement
the "original musical thought is reproduced fully and concretely in its melodic, harmonic and
rhythmic development." Id. (Author's translation).
221. See infra Part V.
222. See DESBOIS, supra note 198, at 143.
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another and other similar arrangements in which the arranger is
"more technician than composer."223 This is similar to the previously
enunciated test, which considers whether two authors with similar
knowledge of music would arrive at substantially the same result in
arranging a preexisting work.2 2 4 A positive answer suggests that
there was little, if any, room for the creative choices identified in Feist
and hence for originality to be present.225 It is also reminiscent of
Judge Posner's denial of copyright protection to the author of a
superimposition of two photographic works as not sufficiently
original.226 That was a departure, as Professor Jaszi rightly noted,
from more liberal copyright doctrine on this point.227
Music is a good illustration of Desbois's proposed test. While
some musical arrangements are too trivial or technical to qualify for
protection, others are self-evidently original. Was Maurice Ravel's
arrangement of Moussorgski's Les tableaux d'une exposition for
orchestra the work of a mere technician?228 Of course not. Most
"variations" must also be allowed to find a home under the umbrella of
223. Id. at 144. As Learned Hand explained in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,
81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936), if an author produced Keats's "Ode on a Grecian Urn" again
independently, it would be original. Id. at 54. That is, however, unlikely, and the test here is one
of likelihood: how likely is it in a given fact pattern that two authors would produce substantially
the same result. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 60, § 8.09[A]. How likely is it that an
author unaware of Keats's work asked to write an Ode on a Grecian urn would write "Heard
melodies are sweet, but those unheard; Are sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes, play on; Not to the
sensual ear, but, more endear'd,; Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone"? See John Keats, Ode on a
Grecian Urn, in THE OXFORD BOOK OF ENGLISH VERSE: 1250-1900, at 729 (A.T. Quiller-Couch
ed., 1919).
224. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
225. In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), the
Supreme Court found that certain choices not dictated by the function of the work, applicable
standards, etc., were those that generated originality for the purposes of copyright law: "These
choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are made independently by the compiler
and entail a minimal degree of creativity, are sufficiently original that Congress may protect
such compilations through the copyright laws." Id. at 348. The Author terms those choices
"creative" because the Court also found that originality required at least a modicum of creativity.
Id. at 362; Gervais, supra note 81, at 975.
226. See Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983). Arguably, the
author-artist did more than merely superimpose two photographic works. For a different view,
see Schrock v. Learning Curve Int'l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 519-21 (7th Cir. 2009), which found that
photographs classified as derivative works are not subject to a heightened standard of
originality. The Author posits it is likely that other courts or judges might have found the work
original.
227. See Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship",
1991 DUKE L. J. 455, 461.
228. This arrangement was the subject of considerable litigation in France. See Cour
d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, le ch., Mar. 10, 1970, D. 1971, 114, note P.L., obs.
Desbois (Fr.). For an excerpt of the arrangement, see MichelMusikl23, Tableaux d'une
Exposition Moussorgsky Ravel Harmonie de Lens, YOUTUBE (May 11, 2012), http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v-DbBkVwbVTs8.
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originality.229 This categorization would also include many works that
are rearranged using modern technologies that allow digital
manipulation of the sound.230
Desbois was also correct when he noted that most
transcriptions and mere transpositions, which often require a
significant amount of technical work but little personal addition by the
arranger, lack the required degree of originality to constitute works in
their own right.231 As a rule of thumb, again ask whether two
arrangers working within similar parameters would achieve a
substantially similar outcome. A negative answer is a strong indicator
that there is room for an original contribution, whereas a positive
answer is a strong indicator that there is no originality.232
B. Germany
Germany's authors-rights doctrine is rich and also very helpful
in understanding the derivative right. Josef Kohler explained that an
author produces a work by expressing what is taken from a common
font. He named the common font Weltsch6pfungsidee and suggested
that a work was an abstract representation (imagindres Bild) the
author derived.233 From this representation the author would give a
work its skeleton or "inner form" (innere Form) and then its outer
form (dussere Form), which adds layers of details to the copyrighted
work.234
This is comparable to the creative-choices approach under US
law.2 3 5  The question becomes whether preexisting ideas were
appropriated, or if protected expression was appropriated, which
might then trigger the derivative right. This idea that authors create
by progressively increasing the precision of their creation from a
general (and unprotected) idea to a protected expression is also found
229. Referring to the suggested originality test, see supra note 223 and accompanying
text. Leopold Stokowski also did an orchestral arrangement of Les Tableaux d'une Exposition
("Pictures at an Exhibition"), and it is quite different. For an excerpt of the arrangement, see
Addiobelpassato, Mussorgsky "Pictures at an Exhibition" arr: Stokowski, YOUTUBE (Aug. 29,
2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-UBjpzkaD8JI.
230. However, the Author would exclude CGM because a human author is needed. See
Daniel Gervais, The Protection Under International Copyright Law of Works Created with or by
Computers, in 22 IIC INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 628, 641-54 (1991); see also
GINSBURG & GORMAN, supra note 38, at 21.
231. DESBOIS, supra note 198, at 143-44.
232. See Gervais, supra note 81, at 978.
233. See IVAN CHERPILLOD, L'OBJET Du DROIT D'AUTEUR 26-27 (1985).
234. See id.
235. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
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in Desbois's writings, as in a number of others.236 Indeed, this is not
that different from the abstraction test in US cases such as Altai.23 7
One could object to the subjectivity of Kohler's test (peering into an
author's mind) because the process may imply that a protected
expression exists before its full, objectively perceptible expression is
available. But the difficulty may be avoided by considering only the
objectified form (in most cases, its first fixation) as protected and,
consequently, appropriable.238
Like France, Germany requires that the derivative work be
original in the sense that it must be a personal intellectual creation
and, specifically in the case of musical works, the result of more than
insubstantial work.239 Germany also has an interesting doctrine of
"free utilization" (freie Benutzung) aimed at accentuating the
distinction between derivation and inspiration.240 The test is one of
236. See CHERPILLOD, supra note 233, at 32. Andrzej Kopff speaks of building a work in
"layers" or "strata" (Schichtenaufbau des Werkes). See id. at 38. De Boor, building on insights
from Goethe, posits that another "layer" is added when the work is perceived because the reader,
viewer, or listener adds her own layer. See id. at 42-43. A communication theorist might add
that the work is therefore only "complete," once perceived, because that is when the form of the
work actually communicates its content, but then each perception is different so that there would
be as many works as there are readers, viewers, and listeners. See Cheryl Boudreau et al., What
Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from Positive Theories of Communication and Legislation, 44
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957, 959 (2007) (applying this reasoning in the field of statutory
interpretation). The perception of the form and content of the work reflects the hermeneutic
approach of the reader, listener, or viewer to the "information" and in determining the semantic
content of the work and its relevance. To appropriate beyond superficial or pure form copying,
surely one must "understand" the work being appropriated on some level, but which work is it?
See also Tyler T. Ochoa, Dr. Seuss, the Juice and Fair Use: How the Grinch Silenced a Parody, 45
J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 546, 557 n.54 (1998).
237. Computer Assoc. Int'l Inc. v. Altai Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). As the court
explained:
At the lowest level of abstraction, a computer program may be thought of in its
entirety as a set of individual instructions organized into a hierarchy of modules. At a
higher level of abstraction, the instructions in the lowest-level modules may be
replaced conceptually by the functions of those modules. At progressively higher levels
of abstraction, the functions of higher level modules conceptually replace the
implantation of those modules . . . until finally one is left with nothing but the
ultimate function of the program.
Id. at 707 (quoting Steven R. Englund, Note, Idea, Progress, or Protected Expression?:
Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MICH.
L. REV. 866, 897-98 (1990)).
238. See CHERPILLOD, supra note 233, at 35-41. Italian doctrine, and in particular the
work of Mario Are, suggests a distinction not between idea and protected expression, but
between the form and content of a work. See id. at 46-49. The form is protected. Id. But so are
some parts of the content (not ideas, theories, or knowledge, but any content produced by the
author's "imaginary"). See id. The Author points out that a difficulty, at least of an evidentiary
nature, may be posed by the fact that fixation is not required under German law for copyright to
subsist.
239. See Adolf Dietz, Germany, in 2 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW & PRACTICE, at
GER-33 (Paul E. Geller ed., 2011).
240. See id.
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"significant dependence."24 1 German law distinguishes adaptations or
"reworking" (Bearbeitungen) from transformations that modify the
inner structure of a work (Umgestaltungen).242  This is key to
establishing the proper scope of the derivative right because changes
to the form or structure (Gestalt) of the primary work is perhaps the
key distinction between reproduction and derivation.243 A derivation
changes the form or structure but not the fundamental character of
the primary work. Like in France, German law draws a doctrinal
difference between copying expression and derivation, the latter of
which the law sees as taking "something else" that cannot be
appropriated without infringing.244 This avoids the overreach of the
reproduction right and is more likely to allow reuses that truly
transform the primary work as beyond the reach of the derivative
right. Put differently, German courts use the "free utilization"
doctrine essentially to limit copyright infringement.2 4 5
This analysis can be taken to a granular level, one that goes
beyond the de minimis limit applied to (mere) reproductions.2 4 6 It
considers what and how much was taken, how much was added, and
the level of transformation. Professor Ivan Cherpillod, who is well
acquainted with both French and German doctrine, explained that
when the originality of what was taken from the primary work is
dubious (discutable), infringement is less likely. 2 4 7 When the primary
work's message is fundamentally altered and much is added, a similar
argument can be made because in both cases the proximity between
the two works is less apparent. Cherpillod cites an opinion from the
Court of Appeal of Paris to explain this view.248 The court noted that
the elements common to the plaintiffs and the defendant's works, two
well-known novelists, were "purely superficial and without
originality."249 The appropriation was lawful because the elements
taken from the plaintiffs work were of "uncertain originality" and
used mostly as background for the new work.250 The approach is
complex because it is infused with normative considerations, such as
241. See id.
242. See id. at GER-108.
243. See CHERPILLOD, supra note 233, at 145-46. The free-utilization doctrine also
applies under Swiss law. See id.
244. See id.
245. See Geller, supra note 30, at 45.
246. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
247. See Geller, supra note 30, at 46.
248. See CHERPILLOD, supra note 233, at 146-47.
249. See id. The case, opposing Jean Hougron and Franqoise Sagan, may be found at 111
REV. INT. DROIT D'AUTEUR 188 (1982).
250. See CHERPILLOD, supra note 233, at 147.
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the need to allow certain transformations (e.g., parody) not as a fair
use (defense) but as outside the scope of the derivative right.251 He
also suggests that the impact of the derivative work on the market for
the original work is only an indicium and not the definition of the
proper scope of the derivative right; it applies only to certain types of
derivative works such as parody but not, for example, two scientific
articles on the same subject.252
C. United Kingdom
Under UK law, it is an infringement of copyright to reproduce
any substantial part of a literary work.25 3 As explained in the
well-known treatise by Copinger and Skone James, however, the
inquiry focuses on whether the originality was appropriated by the
derivative user:
As already stated, the overriding question is whether, in creating the defendant's work,
substantial use has been made of the skill and labour which went into the creation of the
claimant's work and thus those features which made it an original work .... The issue
thus depends therefore not just on the physical amount taken but on its substantial
significance or importance to the copyright work.
2 54
Copinger and Skone James explain that the question may
depend on whether what has been taken is novel or striking, or is
merely a commonplace arrangement of words or well-known material,
an application of a limiting doctrine not unlike scones e faire.255 They
also note that,
As a corollary of the last point, the more simple or lacking in substantial originality the
copyright work, the greater the degree of taking will be needed before the substantial
part test is satisfied. In the case of works of little originality, almost exact copying will
normally be required to amount to infringement.
256
They note in the same breath that "the more abstract and
simple a copied idea, the less likely it is to constitute a substantial
part. Originality, in the sense of the contribution of the authors' skill
and labour, tends to lie in the detail with which the basic idea is
presented."257
251. See id. at 147-49 ("[A court] may authorize the appropriation of protected elements
if the reproduction is justified by a particular interest.") (Author's translation). German courts
also limit the derivative right "when constitutional considerations come into play." See Dietz,
supra note 239, at GER-103.
252. See CHERPILLOD, supra note 233, at 151.
253. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, §§ 16(3), 17(2) (U.K).
254. COPINGER & SKONE JAMES, ON COPYRIGHT § 7-27 (15th ed. 2005) (emphasis added).
255. See supra note 96.
256. COPINGER & SKONE JAMES, supra note 254, § 7-27.
257. Id.
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In light of two recent UK cases,25 8 to target the normative
distinction that delineates the domain of the derivative right, a taking
of the originality of the primary work is what generates an
infringement. A line is drawn, however, at a level of abstraction
where the idea-expression line is crossed. Explaining the applicable
distinction, Lord Hoffman, in Designers Guild Ltd.,259 noted the
following:
[Cjopyright subsists not in ideas but in the form in which the ideas are expressed. The
distinction between expression and ideas finds a place in the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) . . . to which the United
Kingdom is a party. . . . What does it mean? . . . It represents [the author's] choice to
paint stripes rather than polka dots, flowers rather than tadpoles, use one colour and
brush technique rather than another, and so on. 260
The Court then turned to the notion of "substantial part," the
minimum part of a protected work that must be copied to trigger the
application of the reproduction right:
The expression of these ideas is protected, both as a cumulative whole and also to the
extent to which they form a "substantial part" of the work. Although the term
"substantial part" might suggest a quantitative test, or at least the ability to identify
some discrete part which, on quantitative or qualitative grounds, can be regarded as
substantial, it is clear upon the authorities that neither is the correct test.... [T]here
are numerous authorities which show that the "part" which is regarded as substantial
can be a feature or combination of features of the work, abstracted from it rather than
forming a discrete part. . . . Or to take another example, the original elements in the
plot of a play or novel may be a substantial part, so that copyright may be infringed by a
work which does not reproduce a single sentence of the original. If one asks what is
being protected in such a case, it is difficult to give any answer except that it is an idea
expressed in the copyright work.
2 6 1
Providing the subtitle for this Article, Lord Hoffman quipped in
the same opinion that "Copyright law protects foxes better than
hedgehogs."262 Arden LJ explained this rather cryptic formulation of
the derivative right in L. Woolley Jewellers Ltd v. A & A Jewellery
Ltd.,263 as follows:
Lord Hoffmann did not elaborate on his reference to hedgehogs and foxes. However, it
appears that it is a reference to a fragment of Greek poetry of the seventh century BC,
with which the late Sir Isaiah Berlin begins his famous essay on Tolstoy:
"There is a line among the fragments of a Greek poet Archilochus which says 'The
fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing."' (The Hedgehog and
258. Designers Guild Ltd. v. Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd., [20001 UKHL 58, [2001] 1
W.L.R. 2416 (appeal taken from Eng.); Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd.,
[1964] 1 W.L.R. 273 (H.L) (appeal taken from Eng.).
259. Designers Guild Ltd., [2000] UKHL 58, [2001] 1 W.L.R. 2416.
260. Id. at [24].
261. Id. at [24]-[25].
262. Id. at [26].
263. [2002] EWCA Civ 1119, [9], [2003] F.S.R. 15 (Eng. & Wales).
832
2013] THE DERIVATIVE RIGHT 833
the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy's View of History by Isaiah Berlin. (1953, as revised in
1978) (Phoenix) (1999) p.3).
Sir Isaiah points out that scholars have differed about the correct interpretation of these
"dark" words. They may, on the one hand, mean no more than that the fox, for all his
cunning, is defeated by the hedgehog's one defence. But the fragment may also be taken
figuratively as contrasting those with a single central vision and organising principle as
against those who pursue many ends, often unrelated or contradictory. It was, the
Author thinks, in the figurative sense that Lord Hoffmann was using his metaphor.2 6 4
The exposition of UK law presented in the previous paragraphs is
consonant with the more recent case Baigent v. Random House
Group,265 in which Mummery LJ said:
[I]t is not necessary for the actual language of the copyright work to be copied or even
for similar words to be used tracking, like a translation, the language of the copyright
work. It is sufficient to establish that there has been substantial copying of the original
collection, selection, arrangement, and structure of literary material, even of material
that is not in itself the subject of copyright.26 6
The line of cases was also cited with approval recently in SAS Institute
Inc. v. World Programming Ltd.267 The case also opens a broader
window on European law on the matter because, in that opinion,
Judge Arnold referred a number of questions to the European Court of
Justice to see how European directives might impact the analysis.2 68
That court, in an opinion released on May 2, 2012, reiterated the view
that creative choices are what give a work originality.269 Those are
choices made by an author that are not primarily dictated by the
function of the work, the method or tools used, or applicable
standards.270 As a rule of thumb, creative choices are those that one
can isolate by asking whether two authors in similar situations (tools,
direction, budget, etc.) would likely have produced essentially the
same thing.271 In doing so, the Court of Justice's opinion explicitly
follows in the wake of previous opinions,272 namely Infopaq,273
264. Id.
265. [2007] EWCA Civ 247, [145], [2007] F.S.R. 24 (Eng. & Wales).
266. Id. (emphasis added).
267. [2010] EWHC 1829 (Ch.) (Eng. & Wales).
268. Council Directive 1991/250, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42 (EC), codified at Directive
2009/24/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the Legal
Protection of Computer Programs.
269. Case C-406/10, SAS Inst. Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., May*2, 2012, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6 (search case no "406/10"); Daniel Gervais & Estelle Derclaye,
The Scope of Computer Program Protection after SAS: Are We Closer to Answers?, 34 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 565, 567-68 (2012).
270. See Gervais, supra note 81, at 965.
271. See supra note 87.
272. For a full comment, see Gervais & Derclaye, supra note 269.
273. Case C-5/08, Infopaq Int'l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, [2009] ECR 1-6569
(Den.).
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Murphy, FAPL,274 Painer,275 and Football Dataco.276 UK law thus
points to a distinct role for the derivative right, even though it is not
named or identified under that rubric in the statute. Its target is the
appropriation of originality embodied in the author's expression.
D. European Lessons
As shown in this Part, European jurisprudence can be used to
illuminate the distinction between reproduction and derivation. The
two key suggestions are that (a) the difference lies in the transfer of
elements of original expression from the primary work to the derivative
one for the purpose of adding or transforming it, but not to the point of
a fundamental transformation of the primary work;277 and (b) market
impacts of the derivative are indicia used in appropriate cases to
determine whether the derivative right is infringed; they do not
delineate the right.278
Whether one considers derivation as a subset of a broader right
of reproduction, the analysis of European jurisdictions suggests that,
teleologically, normatively, and doctrinally, real distinctions exist
between the two rights. A reproduction copies the expression of the
primary work, while a derivation transfers what makes the primary
work original with the purpose of adding to, or transforming, those
elements.279  The two inquiries are thus distinct because the
reproduction inquiry focuses primarily on the form of what was taken,
while the derivation inquiry looks at a deeper level at what was taken,
in the creative choices that made the primary work worthy of
copyright protection and the nature of what was added or
transformed.280 Additionally, it is in the nature of derivation that
something is added or transformed.281
274. Joined Cases Case C-403/08, Football Ass'n Premier League v. QC Leisure and
Case C-429/08, Murphy v. Media Protection Servs. Ltd., [2012] F.S.R. 1 (appeal taken from
U.K.).
275. Case C-145/10, Painer v. Standard VerlagsGmbH, Dec. 1, 2011, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j.-6 (search case no "145/10").
276. Case C-604/10, Football Dataco v Yahoo! UK Ltd., Dec. 15, 2011, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6 (search case no "604/10").
277. Designers Guild Ltd. v. Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd., [20001 UKHL 58, [2001] 1
W.L.R. 2416 (appeal taken from Eng.).
278. See cases cited supra note 274 and accompanying text.
279. As the US statute makes clear, a derivative need not add to the primary work.
"Abridgement" and "condensation" are examples that show that an infringing derivative work
may take the form of deletion and abbreviation. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
280. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
281. The limit of the right may be reached when the message of the primary work is
fundamentally transformed. See infra Part V. Indeed, Professor Cherpillod uses the verb "to
fade" when describing this situation in which "the individuality of the copied features (traits)
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V. PULLING IT ALL TOGETHER
While forms of human creation have changed greatly from the
Lascaux caves to Aqua's "I'm a Barbie Girl," the way that authors
create (from a copyright viewpoint) is by exercising choices not wholly
dictated by the tools used nor by the possible functionality of their work
or standards. They create by something else, a je ne sais quoi that
makes it almost a certainty that two authors in an identical situation
with similar tools would produce substantially different results.2 82
That is the essence of what copyright aims to incentivize (ex ante) and
protect (ex post); it is the taking and transformation of those same
elements that triggers the application of the derivative right.
Foundational to our understanding of copyright is: (a) that an
author "generates discourse," (b) our societal relationship with this
discourse, (c) the recognition of an individual (as opposed to, e.g., a
community) as the discourse's unique source, and (d) the "legal and
institutional systems that circumscribe, determine and articulate the
realm of discourses."2 8 3 The protection of authors' rights may have
changed dramatically over time, but the discourse-generating function
itself has not.2 84 We want and need authors to perform this function.
It is similarly true that, while the function of the author as discourse
generator may have been stable, the corresponding notion of
authorship is anything but, having strong spatio-temporal ties to its
fades before the originality of the second work." See CHERPILLOD, supra note 233, at 147. As a
matter of US law, the Author suggests that, in harder cases that fit within the latter situation,
the limit of the derivative right is likely to meet its fair use limits. That does not mean that the
doctrinal work on the nature and scope of the derivative right can simply be ignored.
282. This may relate to what Michel Foucault termed a "transhistorical constant" in the
status of authorship. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, WHAT IS AN AUTHOR 237 (1995). However, this
notion of authorship linked to the "individuality" of each author is solidly anchored in
post-Renaissance notions. See id. Foucault adds: "The author is thus a definite historical figure
in which a series of events converge." Id. at 238. The author is seen here as a source of coherent
and "finished" expression. See id.
283. See id. at 235-36.
284. See id. at 239. In discussing the nature of copyright over time, Pierre Recht noted
that "literary property existed in Rome, but it was 'unperceived and unguaranteed' because the
need to protect authors had not yet been felt." Pierre Recht, Copyright: A New Form of Property,
5 COPYRIGHT 94, 97 (1969). Recht sees the property-creation function of copyright as grounded in
the function of the author as expressing (or objectifying) a fundamentally subjective creative
process. He explained: "The subject of the legal status [of writers and artists] is thus a right
which, before being recognized by law, was a subjective right in the limited field of freedom, the
inexpugnable stronghold of individualism." Id. at 95. Recht suggested that copyright be split
between an eminent domain of authors (basically the right to transfer the copyright itself and a
rough equivalent of the Roman abusus) and a right in respect of use and enjoyment (getting paid
for some uses), an equivalent of the usus and fructus elements of property under Roman law. See
id. at 96-98. This might be useful inter alia in designing exceptions and limitations, but the
Author shall leave that for a future article.
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Romantic origins.285 Again, one must bear this in mind along with the
objectives of copyright when trying to define the derivative right. This
Article will now try to pull the threads of the analysis in the previous
Parts together. Given the link between authors and discourse, this
Article first considers the way its conclusions may impact speech.
A. Speech Considerations
In the principles this Article suggests, a reuse that improves
but does not fundamentally alter the message (this might include a
sequel) infringes the derivative right. Fair use may well save the
reuse, but this is a separate inquiry. Is this speech restrictive? This
Article's analysis leads to the conclusion that having fewer restrictions
fits the First Amendment maxim "that everything worth saying shall
be said,"286 but it does not define the right per se. Let us probe a bit
more.
Professor Netanel discusses the significant free-speech impacts
of an overbroad derivative right as follows:
Today, copyright law's governing premise, far from being solicitous to secondary,
transformative authorship, is that "no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how
much of his work he did not pirate" [citing Sheldon v Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81
F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).] That unitary focus on what the
defendant appropriated is broadly applied even to highly creative secondary authors
who engage in little or no verbatim copying of the copyrighted work. . . . Because of
these developments, speech that copies from an existing work at a high level of
abstraction, containing no identity or even close similarity or words or specific elements
of design, but only a resemblance of style, mood, and overall aesthetic appeal, may well
run afoul of the copyright holder's rights.
2 87
It is important to bear in mind, however, that in Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., Learned Hand made a determination
that Metro-Goldwyn was in fact a plagiarist.288 There is a sense that
285. See Jaszi, supra note 227, at 456 ("'Authorship,' as deployed in texts and in cultural
understandings, has been anything but a stable, inert foundation for the structure of copyright
doctrine. Rather, the ideologically charged concept has been an active shaping and destabilizing
force in the erection of that structure.").
286. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE 26 (2d ed. 1960). A broader debate about alienation is explicated in WILLIAM W.
FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 30-37
(2004). Although no short summary can be fair, the Author suggests a freer derivative right
would allow individuals to be more engaged in (and less alienated by) dominant expression,
allowing them to shape or subvert it.
287. NETANEL, supra note 162, at 59-60.
288. Learned Hand stated:
The play is the sequence of the confluents of all these means, bound together in an
inseparable unity; it may often be most effectively pirated by leaving out the speech,
for which a substitute can be found, which keeps the whole dramatic meaning. That
as it appears to us is exactly what the defendants have done here; the dramatic
significance of the scenes we have recited is the same, almost to the letter. True, much
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the plagiarism instinct is triggered when much is taken, with little
original transformation. That is a use that the derivative right would
cover or, if indeed very little is transformed or added, is best seen as a
mere reproduction. To create his work Letty Lynton, the defendant
had copied much, both from a play (Dishonored Lady) and from the
eponymous novel on which it was based.289 Moreover, the court
seemed to believe that not much originality had been added.290 The
case does not stand for the proposition that the differences between
plaintiffs and defendant's works are irrelevant to establishing
infringement ab initio, quite the opposite in fact.29 1 It shows that we
should consider both the creative choices that made the primary work
original and were appropriated and those made by the derivative user
(and possibly author of a derivative work in his own right).292
While the case might be used to demonstrate the risk of an
overboard right, it also suggests a test that comports with the
principles enunciated in Part II: the application of the derivative right
is an equation that reflects the amount of originality of the primary
work, the quality and quantity of the originality transferred from the
primary work to the derivative work, and the amount of originality
added by the author of the derivative work.2 93 This Article will return
to this test several times in the following pages to explicate its role
and limits.
The question of the level of abstraction of the taking from a
primary work is particularly germane to this analysis because setting
the bar at how high the abstraction must be not to infringe (and
beyond which one takes only unprotected ideas) is the hard balancing
act of scoping the derivative right.294 However, the idea that copyright
of the picture owes nothing to the play; some of it is plainly drawn from the novel; but
that is entirely immaterial; it is enough that substantial parts were lifted; no
plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate.
We cannot avoid the conviction that, if the picture was not an infringement of the
play, there can be none short of taking the dialogue.
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1936) (emphasis added).
289. Id. at 49-53.
290. Certainly enough originality to make it a derivative work, if done lawfully. See
supra note 81 and accompanying text.
291. Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 53-56.
292. Id. at 49-53.
293. If the first two are satisfied, that is a prima facie case of infringement; the third is
relevant to fair use. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
294. In Nichols v. Universal Pictures, Learned Hand noted:
[W]hen the plagiarist does not take out a block in suit, but an abstract of the whole,
decision is more troublesome. Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great
number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of
the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general
statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but
there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since
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must navigate up and down a vertical axis going from the exact
expression at the bottom to the "pure idea" at the top is not new. It
emerged inter alia in a number of computer program related cases
where something other than the exact code was copied.295
In isolation this analysis is particularly difficult. In context,
however, one can get there by focusing as much on the nature of the
transformation of the message embedded in the primary work as on
what is appropriated-hence the above equation. The difficulty in
reaching equilibrium lies in reconciling the two underlying policy
objectives (generating a sufficient incentive for creation under
copyright law and protecting free expression).
Perhaps not surprisingly since this Article's analysis reflects a
number of European doctrinal lessons, the Commission of the
European Communities (now European Union) used an approach
compatible with the above equation in its policy analysis:
The obligation to clear rights before any transformative content can be made available
can be perceived as a barrier to innovation in that it blocks new, potentially valuable
works from being disseminated. However, before any exception for transformative
works can be introduced, one would need to carefully determine the conditions under
which a transformative use would be allowed, so as not to conflict with the economic
interests of the rightsholders of the original work.
29 6
And this is the case not just in Europe. In Canada, based on similar
normative foundations, certain forms of UGC are now allowed under a
recent amendment to the Copyright Act.297 The amended legislation
was said to remove an "irritant" for millions of Canadians who neither
understood nor accepted restrictions that they considered obsolete,
unjustified, or both.2 98
Clearly, the shift from a one-to-many entertainment
infrastructure to a many-to-many information infrastructure has deep
consequences on several levels, and one of them relates to the scope of
otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from
their expression, his property is never extended. Nobody has ever been able to fix that
boundary, and nobody ever can.
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (citation omitted). A similar
point was made in recent British cases. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 237.
296. Commission Green Paper on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy, at 19, COM
(2008) 466 final (July 16, 2008).
297. See Gervais, supra note 9, at 465-66. The Act was amended by the Copyright
Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20 (Can.), which received Royal Assent on June 29, 2012. The
exception is not a license to freely copy anything or to upload it to any social website. It is best
seen as a limited right to reuse existing works in a noncommercial context to create new works in
cases where there is no demonstrable impact on the market for such existing works. See id.
298. See Archon Fung, Democratizing the Policy Process, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC POLICY 669, 676-78 (Michael Moran, Martin Rein & Robert E. Goodin eds., 2006).
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reuses requiring an authorization (license).299 Digital technology has
made possible mass fan fiction, mash-ups, music remixes, cloud
computing, collages, and so forth, and blogs have transformed access
to, and arguably the nature of, information.3 0 0 Reusing existing works
without fundamentally transforming the message (which a
recontextualization might do) prima facie infringes the derivative
right (and possibly the reproduction right). Courts examine market
impacts (including established licensing practices) and the need to
maintain an incentive to create certain derivatives as a test to
determine whether the transformation might be beyond the scope of
the derivative right.3 0 1  In hard cases, a US court might
understandably find fair use, a matter to which this Article returns
below.302
B. Reproduction versus Derivation
A pillar of the analysis in this Article is that, while the rights of
reproduction and derivation are joined at the hip, they differ
normatively. In many cases, this is true operationally as well because
some cases of derivation also amount to copying, but others do not.
Conversely, most cases of reproduction do not trigger the derivative
right. For example, a quotation (that goes beyond fair use) infringes
reproduction but not derivation. A work that quotes generates a
message that does not transform the primary work. Instead, it uses
the primary work as support or illustration. By contrast, mounting or
gluing a picture on a wall tile may infringe the derivative right (the
hard question here is whether the recontextualization is still
proximate enough to constitute derivation) but not the reproduction
right if no copy is made (that is, if the original image is used). Unfixed
performances, as already noted, can infringe the derivative right but
299. See Daniel J. Gervais & Daniel J. Hyndman, Cloud Control: Copyright, Global
Memes and Privacy, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 53, 63-64 (2011).
300. See Andrea Slane, Democracy, Social Space, and the Internet, 57 U. TORONTO L.J.
81, 99-100 (2007).
301. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257,
290 (2007) ("To the extent that substitution is likely, there is likely a greater impact on
incentives, and this is a social cost to deeming the use fair. If market substitution is unlikely,
however, the risk to incentives is smaller."). The Author will leave aside for those purposes the
ex ante versus ex post debate. For a discussion, see Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post
Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004).
302. In other jurisdictions where fair use is unavailable as a defense, however, the
analysis of the scope of the derivative right must be fully developed. Very few countries have fair
use in their copyright legislation. See, e.g., Copyright Act, 5768-2007, 2199 LSI 34, 119 (2007)
(Isr.).
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not generate a protectable work in its own right, precisely because
they are unfixed.303
Congress saw the derivative right as an almost complete
overlap with the notion of reproduction when it adopted the 1976 Act,
but it is high time to revisit the nature and scope of the overlap.
Normatively, this seems essential as the derivative right is called
upon to draw acceptable lines for mass reuse of online content.304
Operationally, it is much easier to draw those boundaries if the
purpose of the right is better understood.
The notion of derivative work was described as targeting not
types of uses as much as types of markets and a related desire by
Congress to reserve derivative or peripheral markets to copyright
303. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62 (1976) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5675. The Conference Report states:
The exclusive right to prepare derivative works, specified separately in clause (2) of
section 106, overlaps the exclusive right of reproduction to some extent. It is broader
than that right, however, in the sense that reproduction requires fixation in copies or
phonorecords, whereas the preparation of a derivative work, such as a ballet,
pantomime, or improvised performance, may be an infringement even though nothing
is ever fixed in tangible form.
Id. A typical unfixed use would then be by way of public performance. See Ochoa, supra note 76,
at 999. This opens up a fascinating possibility, namely that a performer's performance is a
separate work. Internationally, the matter was resolved by granting performers a "neighboring
right" which does not recognize them as authors. At the Rome revision Conference of the Berne
Convention in 1928, a proposal was made to include performers in the realm of authors. See
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, RIGHTS OF PERFORMERS IN BROADCASTING TELEVISION AND
MECHANICAL REPRODUCTION OF SOUNDS 122 (1939) ("[The Austrian delegation], however,
expressed the view that performers' rights should be protected on the same basis as had been
adopted in the case of derivative works (translations, adaptations, etc.)."). Whether Yehudi
Menuhin was creating a work when performing Bach's Suites is an open question in the Author's
mind. The Author believes that some performances are "worthy" of being considered copyrighted
works. This is beyond the scope of this Article, however. The Author realizes that merely
acknowledging the possibility would create significant practical difficulties. Moreover, US law
was modified to protect performers against bootlegging, which would suggest they do not have a
right under copyright proper. This in turn raised a constitutional issue, namely whether
Congress could adopt noncopyright protection of performers. See Dotan Oliar, Resolving Conflicts
Among Congress's Powers Regarding Statutes' Constitutionality: The Case of Anti-Bootlegging
Statutes, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467 (2007). A separate inquiry is what gives sound recordings,
which are considered "works" under US copyright law, their originality, if not the performer's
contribution. The US Copyright Act defines a sound recording as the fixation of the sounds, that
is, the performers' contribution; and the 1976 Act House Report recognizes that the performance
can be original. This intellectual mess deserves further work though it has been the subject of
good commentary already. See, e.g., CRAIG JOYCE, COPYRIGHT LAW 203 (8th ed. 2010); 1 NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 60, § 2.10[A][21[b] (discussing record producers' originality requirement
for copyright in the sound recording); 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:161 (2007);
Jon M. Garon, Entertainment Law, 76 TUL. L. REV. 559, 619 (2002) ("The interests in protecting
against record piracy far outweighed the niceties of minimal creative necessity. Like
photography, the choices made (or overlooked) in fixing the sound recording is [sic] sufficiently
creative to meet the originality requirement under Feist.").
304. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
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holders.305 Indeed, as Professor Goldstein noted, the direction of
investment in copyrighted works can often be used as indicia to
determine (in part) the scope of the right.306 This concern is valid
when considering copyright as an incentive and support for markets.
While market impacts do not define the right itself, they can be a
useful guide.307 There are many cases (such as Internet-based uses),
however, in which the "market" is highly dynamic. Trying to define
potential impacts is an unstable target.308
Other examples might help illuminate the distinction between
reproduction and derivation according to the approach suggested in
this Article. A prequel or sequel or an encyclopedia based on an
existing book, film, or series (such as the Harry Potter lexicon)
infringes the derivative right, but in many cases not a properly
construed reproduction right.309 Again, whether it is defensible as fair
use is a different inquiry.310
US courts have not done well when trying to apply derivation
as a distinct right, but there is room for that distinction to do much
more work as new cases emerge. One could start with Arnstein v.
Porter, in which the court identified two separate elements essential to
a plaintiffs suit for infringement: copying and unlawful
305. See Robert J. Morrison, Deriver's Licenses: An Argument for Establishing a
Statutory License for Derivative Works, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 87, 88 (2006) ("The right to
prepare derivative works is a clear statement that Congress wants to provide copyright holders
the sole right to exploit the peripheral markets for a work. The clearest value of a derivative
work to the copyright holder is the ability to reach new markets.").
306. See Goldstein, supra note 26, at 227.
307. To quote Learned Hand:
If the defendant took so much from the plaintiff, it may well have been because her
amazing success seemed to prove that this was a subject of enduring popularity. Even
so, granting that the plaintiffs play was wholly original, and assuming that novelty is
not essential to a copyright, there is no monopoly in such a background.
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930).
308. Additionally, a definitional effort grounded on expected online markets presents a
risk of circularity. See R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 495 (2008). Reese observed:
And just as courts have recognized in the fourth factor that it would be circular to
identify market harm merely from the fact that the particular defendant being sued
did not pay the copyright owner for the particular use she made, courts may need to
find ways to avoid a similar circularity in judging transformativeness. Courts should
probably not conclude that a defendant's use is not transformative simply because the
copyright owner herself might at some point use (or intend to use) the work for the
same purpose, but should probably also not conclude that a defendant's use must be
transformative if the copyright owner has not yet exploited her work for the same
purpose.
Id.
309. See Dennis S. Karjala, Harry Potter, Tanya Grotter, and the Copyright Derivative
Work, 38 ARiz. ST. L.J. 17, 32-34 (2006).
310. See id. at 34-36.
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appropriation.31 1  Then one might consider Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Products, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp. and its
intrinsic-extrinsic test, which separates substantial similarity in ideas
(extrinsic) and substantial similarity in expressions (intrinsic).312
From Krofft, one might then move to Cavalier v. Random House, Inc.,
which proposes a different two-part analysis, namely an extrinsic test
(objective comparison of specific expressive elements) and an intrinsic
test (subjective comparison that focuses on "whether the ordinary,
reasonable audience" would find the works substantially similar in the
"total concept and feel of the works").3 13 Finally, one might go back to
the Second Circuit in Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., which employed an
ordinary-observer test to determine copying but a "more refined"
version of the test when the work alleged to have been infringed
incorporates public domain elements.314 Courts often used the tests to
decide whether expert testimony was admissible or probative in
deciding infringement.315 It seems fair to conclude that a number of
courts have increasingly tried to separate reproduction from
derivation qua derivation (that is, whether or not a reproduction may
also be occurring) but without fully getting there.
It is time to consider a more nuanced and transparent
approach. Even a quick tour d'horizon suffices to illustrate the role
that drawing proper distinction between the reproduction right and
the derivative right might play. This Article's proposed equation
above is comparable to Krofft and Boisson, that is, considering
intrinsic similarity and asking whether what "intrinsically" makes the
primary work original was taken, and then whether those elements
were transformed.316
Conversely, the perils of a misunderstood distinction between
the two rights are visible in the opinions that have avoided trying to
make the distinction altogether, preferring instead to limit themselves
to a "market impact" analysis.317  That approach tends to conflate
311. 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946).
312. 562 F.2d 1157, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 1977).
313. 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002).
314. 273 F.3d 262, 272-73 (2d Cir. 2001).
315. For a discussion of the slightly different tests (or versions) applied by the various
circuits and the role of expert testimony, see Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality, and the
End of the Scones A Faire and Merger Doctrines for Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 779 (2006).
316. A court might also ask an expert to demonstrate the creative process pertinent to
the type of creation at play in a given case in determining infringement. See Nielander, supra
note 65, at 17 ('The focus in this context would be on the qualitative aspects of a work rather
than the quantitative tally of expressive elements in search of substantial similarity.").
317. See infra note 326 and accompanying text.
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derivation and fair use.3 18 This is because while market impact is
used to define the right in those cases, it is also the fourth fair use
criterion (market impact) that has been the heart of the fair use
doctrine since the supersession test developed in Folsom v. Marsh.319
It is indeed a paradox of contemporary US copyright jurisprudence
that fair use, which affects all of the exclusive rights, including the
derivative right, should be formulated in terms that virtually read on
the accepted definition of one of those exclusive rights (namely the
derivative right).320 This is not exactly surprising in light of the
Supreme Court's direction:
Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use,
the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the
creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use
doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright.
3 2 1
But while this (rightly) pertains to fair use, it does not define the
derivative right. Deciding whether the derivative right applies as a
matter contingent on market impacts is both unstable and
normatively undesirable for the same reason as using the market to
define the right itself.3 2 2
The first step under the derivation inquiry boils down to asking
whether the creative choices that make the primary work original were
taken without fundamental alteration. Hence, market impact is a
mere guide in appropriate cases, as, for example, market success is a
guide that an invention is nonobvious for purposes of patent law.3 2 3
The second step is considering the nature of what was added or
318. The three A.R.T. cases were already mentioned in terms of market impact. See infra
note 326 and accompanying text.
319. 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). Folsom was not a fair use case of
course, nor does it use that term. The supersession test was meant to ensure that copyright
covered additional markets. That said, Barton Beebe's empirical analysis suggests that the
fourth factor was the most important until at least 2005. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study
of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 616-17 (2008) (noting
that in Campbell the Supreme Court attempted to change the dictum in Harper & Row that the
fourth factor was the "most important" by stating that all of the factors are to be "weighed
together"; still, 26.5 percent of lower courts post-Campbell have stated that the fourth factor is
the most important). The Author suggests it may be changing as a result of Campbell.
320. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); see Michael J. Madison, A
Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525, 1670 (2004) ("As a beacon
of fair use, the transformative use standard has become all things to all people."); see also
Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2548-68 (2009)
(discussing the numerous ways in which "transformative" is applied in a variety of cases).
321. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
322. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
323. Commercial success is one of the secondary considerations used to determine
nonobviousness under Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). It is only that,
however-not a hard test. See Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enters., Inc., 632 F.3d 1358, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
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transformed, including by recontextualization. Various limiting
doctrines, in particular fair use and the idea-expression dichotomy,
will then limit the reach of the right but as a separate inquiry.324
This approach is not only normatively preferable, it is also
consistent with statutory and historical developments (in the United
States, in France, in Germany, and elsewhere internationally) that
have put the spotlight on the derivation qua derivation-in named
forms or as penumbral right-instead of market impacts per se.32 5 The
protection of markets allows a clearer separation of fair use and
derivation in the analytical sequence.
In sum, there are two avenues by which to test for an
infringement of the derivative right as distinct from copying. The first
focuses on reuses that impact the market(s) for an existing work, in
which case questions emerge as to which markets are reasonably
expected to be developed for a given type of work, a central issue in
the three A.R.T. cases.326 A second avenue is the equation suggested
above, namely, considering the nature of what was taken (whether
measured quantitatively, qualitatively, or both), and what
transformation was done by the derivative user or author, in
particular whether the message contained in those elements was
fundamentally altered by recontextualization or otherwise. Either
avenue will raise an interface issue with fair use because market
impact and amount and substantiality of the use are, respectively, the
third and fourth fair use criteria.327 The second avenue, which
separates the two inquiries, seems closer to the history and purpose of
the derivative right.
Visually, this could be shown as follows:
324. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
325. As Von Lewinski explained:
[A]ll such transformations are covered under the general term "alteration," which
includes any change of a work where the original work can still be recognized in the
alteration but, at the same time, is not simply reproduced, be it in the same or
different size or format. Accordingly, if the original work has only served as
inspiration . .. then the second one is not an alteration.
VON LEWINSKI, supra note 171, at 143; see also RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 185, at 479
("Although little was said at the time of the Berlin Conference as to the precise scope of the term
'adaptations,' it seems clear from the later conference that a wide interpretation was intended.").
326. Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997); Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque
A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988); Mufioz v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 829 F. Supp. 309 (D.
Ala. 1993), aff'd 38 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1994).
327. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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This diagram shows that some cases of derivation are also
reproductions, but others are not. Additionally, derivations tend to
appropriate elements higher in the abstraction continuum.328
Obviously, to be protected the appropriation must be below the level of
unprotected ideas.329 As this Article has suggested throughout, even if
one sees derivation as a form of reproduction in many cases, or as
somehow subsumed under reproduction in a categorical taxonomy of
copyright right, derivation stands on its own normative footing and
must be considered (at least as a first step) as a fully distinct right to
be understood. Then the derivation and reproduction analyses can be
combined (in a specific case).
To determine whether a derivation qua derivation has taken
place, it may be useful to recall that, according to the view that
informs the principles enunciated in Part II and the international and
comparative analyses above, it is the originality that is appropriated
in a derivative work. Originality-rooted in creative choices made by
the author of a primary work-is appropriated (and thus presumably
worth taking) by a derivative user or author for the purpose of
reworking those creative choices (often to create a new work). It is that
originality (resulting from creative choices) that a court should aim to
protect, absent an applicable defense or other exception.330 This
328. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
329. The Author left a bit of space below the idea-expression line but above the
derivation "box" for possible reproductions at a higher level of abstraction.
330. This occurs in a number of cases. See, e.g., Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc.
v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 133 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Jurists have long been vexed by the
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should not depend on a showing of the existence of a real or expected
market nor on copying of the form of the expression, which is the
proper realm of the reproduction right.331 Derivation is best seen as
taking what makes a preexisting work (or more than one) original for
the purpose of transforming it, but not to the point of a fundamental
alteration of the message. Market impact provides a useful clue, but it
remains a secondary consideration. A translation or sequel in the
same vein as the primary work is a good example of a derivative work,
as would be a change in the genre or form. By contrast, a reuse that
alters the fundamental message of the primary work typically does not
appropriate the protected elements of that work.332 It is important to
recall that the derivative right is subject to a number of limiting
doctrines, including fair use, which factor into market impact.333
Another limit on the right is the application of the eBay-Salinger
test-if the public interest so dictates.334
Applying the test to the three-dimensional versions of objects,
would a three-dimensional "copy" of, say, "Mattie the Clown," be
considered a reproduction for copyright purposes?335 It is clearly a
case of taking the creative choices, but something is added. The
question is, what? The added physical dimension (from two to three)
task of precisely identifying that which separates inexact copies that infringe from those that do
not.").
331. Other considerations, such as whether the author of the second work had sought a
license (for the work at issue or previously) may also impact a finding of fair use:
Courts, unfortunately, have repeatedly made the mistake. It is no coincidence that the
principal cases establishing broad rights against infringement by derivative works
characteristically involve situations in which the alleged infringer had at some earlier
point sought a license. The tendency in these cases, always unarticulated because
legally irrelevant, is to take the earlier quest for a copyright license as evidence that
one was needed, and to bar defendants from asserting that the rights they once tried
to acquire do not now exist. For the reasons given, the emphasis is clearly misplaced.
Goldstein, supra note 38, at 221. However, trying to identify a lost licensing transaction may be
inappropriate. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994).
332. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 60, § 13.03 [A].
333. The Author is comforted in that regard by Professor Reese's analysis of all published
circuit court opinions dealing with the derivative right through 2007. See Reese, supra note 308,
at 484-85. Professor Reese distinguishes derivation by transformation of purpose and
transformation of content. See id.
334. In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), the US Supreme Court
applied a four-factor test based on traditional equitable principles to the issuance of injunctions
in patent cases. In Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010), the Second Circuit applied the
test to copyright, holding that "although the District Court applied our Circuit's longstanding
standard for preliminary injunctions in copyright cases, our Circuit's standard is inconsistent
with the 'test historically employed by courts of equity' and has, therefore, been abrogated by
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange." Id. at 74-75.
335. "Mattie the Clown" is a painting by Mira Evans. See Mattie the Clown, FINE ART
AMERICA fineartamerica.com/featured/mattie-the-clown-myra-evans.html (last visited Mar. 13,
2013).
846
2013] THE DERIVATIVE RIGHT 847
might well be compared to a genre transition.336 Viewed as such, the
application of the derivative right (for infringement purposes) to this
type of transformation would seem to fit. A separate inquiry is
whether a new derivative work is created. The simple answer is no if
only trivial, mechanical, or "sweat of the brow" work is what modified
the physical properties of the preexisting two-dimensional work to the
three-dimensional realm.3 3 7 An emerging technology (as of this
writing) of three-dimensional printers comes to mind. If that
technology is used to produce a useful object from a set of instructions
(blueprint), then the exclusion (in US law at least) of
three-dimensional protection for useful articles would likely apply.338
However, I can easily see the day when such a printer will be able to
produce a three-dimensional object based not on instructions but on a
two-dimensional picture.339
Finally, there is a circular element in the enforcement
discussion that we must eliminate. When courts in the United States
decide that an infringing derivative cannot be a protected "work"
336. See supra notes 88 and 124 and accompanying text.
337. Naturally, if human choices are involved and demonstrably present in the
three-dimensional object, that object might claim originality and the status of work in its own
right. This would be a matter for evidence in an actual case. Entertainment Research Group, Inc.
v. Creative Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 1997) is relevant in this context. The Ninth
Circuit held that three-dimensional inflatable costumes based on copyrighted, two-dimensional
cartoon designs were insufficiently original to constitute derivative works because the changes to
make the three-dimensional version were dictated wholly by functional considerations, rather
than creative judgments. For a discussion, see Michael J. Madison, The End of the Work As We
Know It, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 325 (2012).
There is little doubt that the reverse (a three-dimensional object "copied" in two dimensions)
can also be an infringement. Indeed, in that direction (three to two dimensions), the use seems
closer to a "straight copy" then the other way around because of the difference between the types
of intellectual work involved. As the Eighth Circuit explained in Warner Bros. Entertainment,
Inc. v. X One XProductions, 644 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2011), to make figurines and statuettes based
on cartoon characters "a three-dimensional rendering must add new visual details regarding
depth to the underlying two-dimensional image." 644 F.3d 584, 603. Another example is provided
in Walco Products Inc. v. Kittay & Blitz Inc., 354 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (finding that
Christmas tree ornamental kits substantially copied plaintiffs copyrighted works of art even if
the kits needed to be assembled by the consumer to recreate the work of art in three dimensions).
338. Under 17 U.S.C. § 113(b). For example, a two-dimensional sketch of a couture
design is protected under copyright law, but the three-dimensional garment is not because it is
considered a useful article. See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox:
Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1745-46 (2006). For
a British case on point, see British Leyland Motor Corp. v. Armstrong Patents Co., [1986] A.C.
577 (U.K.) (finding that copyright protection in a two-dimensional drawing could be used to
prohibit the creation of a three-dimensional version). For a discussion, see Orit Fischman Afori,
Reconceptualizing Property in Designs, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1105, 1173 (2008).
339. In fact, the automated algorithmic nature of the process might be sufficient evidence
of a lack of creative choices, the hallmark of originality. For an example, see Meshwerks, Inc. v.
Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1268 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that only
creativity in the finished product, not the process itself, is protectable under copyright). See also
supra note 70.
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because it is infringing, they do not necessarily decide that an
infringement could not occur absent the creation of a new work.340
Instead, what they decide is that the new "work" is not protected
under the statute.341 Conceptually, the assertion is that no copyright
right should be granted to an infringing author, but this does not
preclude an analysis of whether a new (though infringing) work of
authorship would have been created.342
C. Derivation as Art
This Article ends the analysis of the derivative right with a
note of caution concerning art that copies art, a major form of which is
known as "appropriation art." In recent years, the related
phenomenon of UGC in myriad forms (mash-ups, fan sites, etc.) has
also come to the fore.34 3 The issue mentioned above of making
"mechanical" three-dimensional representations of two-dimensional
works is different to the extent that a machine does all the work with
little or no human direction.344 This section discusses appropriation
with changes made by a (human) author that may trigger the
derivative right. This area will require courts to consider the
derivative right with the utmost caution. It is also an area where
understanding the derivative right-and its linkages with fair
use-will become increasingly important.
It may be useful to distinguish fair use to create new
works-even if derived (in colloquial terms) from preexisting
material-and straight reuse. Transformativeness peaks more to the
former than the latter and explains why allowing "derivation" as art,
under fair use or because it does not fall under the exclusive right to
begin with, normatively requires more leeway than copying to
improve, say, online access to works that are not creatively
transformed.345 In addition, copyright collectives can easily license
340. See Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431 (C.D. Cal. Apr.
25, 1989).
341. As discussed above, the derivative right can be infringed without fixation but no
new unfixed work can be created under the US statute. See supra note 17 and accompanying
text.
342. Nimmer suggested that under US law, if the work has been created lawfully,
§ 106(2)'s grant of the right to prepare derivative works "may be thought to be completely
superfluous." 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 60, § 8.09[A]. The Author tried in this Article to
situate the difference.
343. See Daniel Gervais, supra note 4, at 842-43; see also Steven Hetcher, The Kids Are
Alright: Applying a Fault Liability Standard to Amateur Digital Remix, 62 FIA. L. REV. 1275,
1326-27 (2010).
344. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
345. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007). In the
Author's view, this would be much better dealt with under a statutory safe harbour (as with
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reuse of preexisting works "as is"; however, copyright collectives are
much less nimble in licensing uses that imply a creative
transformation.34 6  This is also relevant as part of a fair use
analysis.347
Appropriation art, a major strand of postmodern art, has
already generated a substantial amount of litigation involving not just
the "appropriators," but also museums debating their acquisition
policies.348 It is the poster child for hard derivation cases under
copyright law. Works by artists such as Andy Warhol, Robert
Rauschenberg, and Jeff Koons have been the subject of intellectual
property disputes.349 In a movement that was already well known by
the Dadaists, appropriation art is the latest form of
decontextualization.350 But art copying art is not new. Would we
consider Delacroix or C6zanne infringers for "copying" Rubens's "The
Internet Service Providers), allowing search engines to link to and present acceptable excerpts of
publicly available material on the Internet. The Author suggests that it is not because one
believes this function is normatively desirable that it should, ipso facto, be fair use.
346. The statute itself contains a compulsory license for "covers" of published musical
works. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006). Collectives are at their best working with a repertory of works
that are to be used according to standard terms. By contrast, the reuse of a specific work often
requires a negotiation that must include input from the author or other rightsholder (for
example, the use of music in a motion picture or advertisement).
347. See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). The case
stands for the proposition that a reasonably available license is a relevant consideration under
the fourth factor:
It is indisputable that, as a general matter, a copyright holder is entitled to demand a
royalty for licensing others to use its copyrighted work . . . . However, not every effect
on potential licensing revenues enters the analysis under the fourth factor.
Specifically, courts have recognized limits on the concept of "potential licensing
revenues" by considering only traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed
markets when examining and assessing a secondary use's "effect upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work."
Id. at 929-30.
348. See John Henry Merryman, Museum Ethics, 2006 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY:
LEGAL ISSUES IN MUSEUM ADMIN. 3, 9 (2006).
349. See, e.g., Dauman v. Andy Warhol Found. for Visual Arts, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 9219
(TPG), 1997 WL 337488, at *1-3 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1997) (denying the defendant's motion to
dismiss a claim of misappropriation of a copyright image by the late Andy Warhol, which formed
the basis for his work "Sixteen Jackies"). Similarly, the publicity photo of Marilyn Monroe taken
by Gene Korman used by Andy Warhol for his 'Marilyn" series was the subject of a private
settlement with the Warhol Foundation. See Molly Ann Torsen, Beyond Oil on Canvas: New
Media and Presentation Formats Challenge International Copyright Law's Ability to Protect the
Interests of the Contemporary Artist, 3 SCRIPT-ED 45 (2006) (suggesting Warhol's work was
original enough to preclude liability); Robert Rauschenberg and Pete Turner, COPYRIGHT
WEBSITE, http://www.benedict.com/Visual/Rauschenberg/Rauschenberg.aspx (last visited Mar. 3,
2013) (detailing how Rauschenberg was sued by Turner for using Turner's photograph, which
appeared in an issue of Time magazine, in his work); see also Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301,
305-06, 314 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that Koons's work, which incorporated Rogers's photograph,
infringed Rogers's copyright in his photograph).
350. Jean-Pierre Cuzin, Au Louvre, D'aprs les Maitres, in REUNION DES MUSEES
NATIONAUX, COPIER, C'EST CREER DE TURNER A PICASSO 26, 28 (1993).
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Landing of Marie de M6dicis at Marseilles"?351 Certainly they were
adding their own personality, copying themselves as much as Rubens,
in the words of Catherine Kintzler.352  What of Dali "copying"
Raphael?353 A derivative use may be amply original, but its originality
does not always save it from also being an infringement. This Article
does, however, suggest, as noted above, that it is an equation that
reflects the amount of originality of the primary work, the quality and
quantity of the originality transferred from the primary work to the
derivative work, and the amount of originality and purpose added by
the author of the derivative work.3 5 4
Modern artists, such as Sherri Levine, David Salle, Susan Pitt,
Richard Prince, and, in the 2008 US presidential campaign, Shepard
Fairey, have made the incorporation of previous works into their own
works (without permission) a central element of their artistic
statement.355 In the realm of copying as art, as noted above, there is
an argument that copying or deriving is itself creative and, more
broadly, that art is different.356 Art is art if it transforms or even
destroys. Art incorporates and sometimes becomes a meme. It is
copied as an element in a broader cultural construct, a vehicle for
communal expression. Art may imitate, for example as homage when
Man Ray created his "Violon d'Ingres".357 Often, artists begin by
351. Assume that there is no expiration of the term of protection for the sake of
discussion. A copy of Rubens's masterpiece may be seen at Peter Paul Rubens, The Landing of
Marie de Midicis at Marseilles, WEB GALLERY OF ART, http://www.wga.hulhtmlm/r/rubens/
40histor/Olmedici.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2013).
352. Catherine Kintzler, La Copie et L'Original, 2003 REVUE DEMETER 1, 6.
353. See id; Conrad H. Roth, Dali on Raphael, VARIETIES OF UNRELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
BLOG (Oct. 3, 2006), http://vunex.blogspot.com/2006/10/dali-on-raphael.html.
354. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
355. The Author wishes to thank Walt Lehman for providing much useful background
and insight on this point.
356. See Daniel J. Gifford, Innovation and Creativity in the Fine Arts: The Relevance and
Irrelevance of Copyright, 18 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 569, 577-79 (2000). Gifford states:
Contrary to the way commercial development proceeds, work in the fine arts is not
generally undertaken for profit. At the level of production, it is difficult to tie the
supply of painting, sculpture, or composition of classical music directly to a system of
economic rewards. . . . [Airtistic production is most analogous to basic research
because its guidance is left to the idiosyncrasies of the individual artist. By contrast, a
complex system of museums, galleries, and critics guide its distribution. That system
once shared a common view on artistic standards, which influenced both distribution
and production accordingly. Largely as a result of the breakdown of the governing
artistic paradigm, that system is in the process of becoming increasingly responsive to
a broad array of tastes.
Id. at 578-79.
357. See Cuzin, supra note 350, at 29.
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copying, as any art school instructor could attest.3 58  Copying is
learning, homage, and a necessary step for art to grow. It is the
method by which artists appropriate the past, an often-indispensable
step to their own contribution.
What if the reuser seems to be exploiting the primary work and
affecting its market? How does one fairly distinguish that "step" from
a new contribution that the law should allow? That is precisely the
question that properly scoping the derivative right (with its
reproduction cousin in many cases) poses. It also shows that market
impacts are likely a poor normative guide to deciding what art the law
should allow.
By copying a master's work, the "pupil" might at least get a
glimpse of the great author's mind, which would seem like a
normatively desirable process.35 9 "L'art nat d'un regard sur l'art," as
the French would say: art is born from a view on existing art.360 As
such, one may see it as categorically excised from the notion of
derivation. In some cases, because of the equation mentioned above,
the choices made by the reuser are such that normatively this may be
the right outcome. In harder cases, especially if there is commercial
exploitation of the derivative, a court might decide that the amateur
(or professional) nature of the use is best considered a protected
derivation, based on the principle of proximity. That, this Article
suggests, is the proper approach. That principle is subject to the
equation (or test) suggested previously. As a subsequent step, a fair
use analysis may be used to limit the reach of the right.
UGC is subject to the same note of caution. Many forms of
UGC are noncommercial but also nonprivate. An excellent example is
doujinshi, comic-like magazines combining anime, manga, and video
358. See Johnson Okpaluba, Appropriation Art: Fair Use or Foul?, in DEAR IMAGES: ART,
COPYRIGHT AND CULTURE 198-99 (Daniel McClean & Karsten Schubert eds., 2002). Okpaluba
notes:
[A]ppropriation art is essentially an artistic technique not peculiar at all to the
twentieth century, as it has always been used as an aid to teach drawing. There is a
long tradition of artists who have appropriated elements of other artist's work and
recycled them into their own works, starting with Picasso's cubist collages. In the
early twentieth century, artists like Picasso, Braque, Gris, and Schwitters began to
use "found" objects in their work; everyday items such as newspapers, litter, string,
and photographs.
Id. As a matter of "art policy," does it matter much whether the artist uses an actual article
clipped from the New York Times or "copies" it with her brush? The Author posits that as a
matter of copyright policy the difference is, of course, crucial, because the first use does not
include a reproduction. It may, however, involve a transformation and hence application of the
derivative right.
359. Cuzin, supra note 350, at 35.
360. See id. at 30-31.
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games.361 Major social events attended by thousands of fans are
organized to share doujinshi.362 Online fan sites also come to mind.363
These websites and forms of UGC cannot all be comfortably
pigeonholed as noncommercial.36 4  This clashes with traditional
accounts, which tend to present UGC as noncommercial or
"amateur."365 While this view may have been fully justified in the
early days of UGC, a number of ways to monetize at least some forms
of UGC are emerging, and litigation tends to follow as soon as a
significant commercial line is crossed.366 Courts should make room for
at least some forms of commercial (or at least nonamateur) UGC to
balance the promotion of new forms of creativity and the need to
maintain valid ex ante incentives and ex post rewards for creators of
primary works used, even if the new forms strike the court as being of
poor quality.367
The normative implications are clear: should one stop
generations of younger creators who were "born digital" and see no
good reason not to use those tools to create, even if it includes some
measure of appropriation? When does that appropriation cross the
line?3 68  When there is sufficient proximity between the works,
especially where much of the primary work's creative choices have
been appropriated and little has been added. The analysis should be
informed by the fact that copyright has always tried to avoid judgment
on the quality or artistic merit of new forms of creation, and the fact
that the appropriation of the past is a necessary ingredient of an
361. Anime is a form of animation, and manga is a form of Japanese comics. See Salil
Mehra, Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain Why All the Cartoons My Kid
Watches are Japanese Imports?, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 155, 164 (2002); Nathaniel T. Noda,
Copyrights Retold: How Interpretive Rights Foster Creativity and Justify Fan-Based Activities, 20
SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 131, 132 (2010).
362. See Noda, supra note 361, at 132. This includes a three-day market in Tokyo known
as "Comiket." See COMIKET, http://www.comiket.co.jp/index-e.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2012).
363. See AARON SCHWABACH, FAN FICTION AND COPYRIGHT 18 (2011).
364. Commerciality is not a bar to a finding of fair use but it is a (major) strike against
the defendant under the fourth factor. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
584-85 (1994).
365. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE
HYBRID ECONOMY 254 (2008).
366. See Casey Fiesler, Note, Everything I Need to Know I Learned from Fandom: How
Existing Social Norms Can Help Shape the Next Generation of User-Generated Content, 10 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 729, 752-53 (2008).
367. This "trap" of judging the quality of a primary or allegedly infringing work is
common, and may well be justified as a cultural matter, but not as a factor under copyright law
(no judging of artistic merit). For a discussion of the former (cultural) aspects, see ANDREW
KEEN, THE CULT OF THE AMATEUR: How TODAY'S INTERNET IS KILLING OUR CULTURE 3-4 (2007).
On the latter (copyright) aspect, see James Grimmelmann, The Ethical Visions of Copyright Law,
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2005, 2006 (2009).
368. On that distinction, see Gervais, supra note 4, at 850-55.
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intergenerational dialogue, which might take several new and possibly
irreverent forms.369 At the very least, judges should be aware of any
underlying "bias."370 Originality is what is added by the artist both as
a contribution to the work's inherent structure (what one might call
aesthetic originality) and, especially for new art forms, as a posture of
the artist vis-a-vis her creative milieu.371
If we mean it when we say that we want to foster the
emergence of new expression, the law should encourage this form of
evolution of art, whether seen as positive or not.3 7 2 Again, this
Article's suggestion is that courts should tread with the utmost
caution here. One may find some forms of contemporary art to be
pure genius or garbage. One may, however, change one's mind
tomorrow. More importantly, one should not want to be the judge of
what is or should be art today, and it certainly is not nor indeed has it
ever been the historical role of courts to decide what should be allowed
to exist as art today or for posterity. This means courts should be
369. The exclusion of artistic merit in copyright policy is well established, at least
theoretically, in most legal systems. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S.
239, 251 (1903) (including Justice Holmes's famous articulation on this point). Yet even courts
that try often fail:
[I]t is no longer necessary or valuable or even possible to dissect a work of art to
uncover the universal truths or ideas which must remain freely available to all future
authors. If people value instead that creative process itself, rather than a particular
end product, as conceptual artists do, then copyright's focus on that end product
seems misplaced. Every work of art, even if a copy of another's work, could be seen as
valuable in the sense that it was unique to the particular artist who engaged in that
process. To the extent that copyright law rests on the view that the government
should prohibit copying of expression in order to protect the original artist but allow
the copying of ideas in order to encourage the creation of new works, it may be
missing the point. There may be no way for the new artist to extract the "idea"
without the "expression" of it, and moreover, there may be no point in making that
artist attempt to do so because that artist's creation of his or her work may be
considered valuable as a reflection of that artist and that artist's definition of what is
art. For these reasons, the idea-expression dichotomy, conceptually grounded in
classical and neoclassical views of art that are no longer widely accepted, is doomed to
fail. Courts have no philosophical or objective basis on which to rely in trying to
distinguish the ideas from the expression in works of art.
Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and
the Inevitability ofArtistic Value Judgments, 66 IND. L.J. 175, 231 (1990).
370. See Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 845-46 (2005).
[C]ourts do adopt aesthetic theories in their resolution of these art cases, they are just
unaware that they are doing so. Examples of almost every aesthetic theory can be
found employed by a court that must decide whether an object is art. These theories
are what enable courts to reach conclusions about the art objects. The problem is that
these courts are not self-conscious or explicit about the theories of art they are
employing.
Id. In the words of the famous German copyright scholar Eugen Ulmer: "It is certainly true that,
if we are to do justice to modern art, we shall have to be as broad-minded and liberal as possible
in deciding what constitutes a work for copyright purposes." Ulmer, supra note 96, at 81.
371. Kintzler, supra note 352, at 8.
372. See id. The Author suggests that in some cases transgression might, in an ironic
twist, become the norm.
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liberal in finding originality in "derivative art," thus tipping the
infringement equation toward the reuser in appropriate cases.373 In
cases where a court might find art subject to the derivative right,
there should be a serious consideration of the application of a limiting
doctrine.374
For appropriation art specifically, Okpaluba suggests a
nomenclature that distinguishes three types of works: appropriation of
a whole, unchanged image; montage or collage (incorporating multiple
works or fragments to create a new one); and "simulationism"
(appropriation of a genre to produce a work that does not resemble a
new type of work).375 Presumably, the idea-expression dichotomy
saves the third type if it involved any misappropriation (from a
copyright standpoint), while the second is likely to be transformative
fair use. The first is the harder case. It might involve
transformativeness by recontextualization. A court might consider
both inherent changes to the work and external changes (context) that
make any negative impact on the market for the primary work
unlikely.376 This consideration might include a parody (fair use)
defense as a change of context bordering on social critique.377
In sum, the Author would structure the analysis of
infringement in this particularly sensitive context-one in which
eliminating cultural and temporal bias seems essential yet almost
impossible to achieve-by scoping the derivative right using proximity
as a filter before the court finds derivation. If the court finds
derivation to be present, as suggested above, application of fair use
may be required to permit "courts to avoid rigid application of the
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity
which that law is designed to foster."3 78
VI. CONCLUSION
US doctrine has painted with a very broad brush to define the
right of reproduction as the taking of any protected expression from a
work. This superimposes the idea-expression dichotomy on the
373. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
374. See Okpaluba, supra note 358, at 200.
375. See id.
376. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992). The case is interesting for its
analysis of fair use and specifically parody, a defense the court ultimately rejected. Id. at 304-12.
377. That is one reading of Campbell, in which the 2 Live Crew version of Roy Orbison's
"Oh, Pretty Woman" was arguably as much a take on the naivet6 of the original work as a
comment on prostitution. See Ochoa, supra note 236, at 554.
378. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research
Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)).
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infringement analysis and has mostly limited the derivative right to
marginal cases such as performances of unfixed derivative uses.
Recent court opinions tend to emphasize the distinction between the
two rights more clearly but more work remains to be done. It is time
to understand the distinct normative foundations of the derivative
right in US copyright law.
This Article's analysis started from known quantities. It then
added to those known quantities an analysis of doctrinal and
normative teachings from international copyright law as enshrined in
the Berne Convention and in British, French, and German legal
systems, to look for the pith and substance of derivation and what
distinguishes it from reproduction. The polestar was a set of
principles, which this Article both explicates and emonstrates, and
which can and should be used to properly scope the derivative right.
The Article argues and demonstrates that there is a hard line that
divides fundamental changes that are noninfringing under a proper
derivative right analysis (in most cases because the idea, not the
expression, is appropriated), and those that are noninfringing as
transformative fair uses. In the last Part, this Article suggests that
one should be particularly careful in extending the derivative right to
forms of creation that are based on appropriation of previous works
and offers suggestions concerning the enforcement of the right.
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